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ABSTRACT
Public-Private joint ventures, while not a new concept,
are by no means a convention in the real estate field. They
hold many advantages as a model for development, and will
become increasingly prevalent in the future, especially in
urban areas. Modern trends toward citizen participation and
publically offered incentives to developers will work to make
the concept better accepted. Faneuil Hall Marketplace is an
example of such a joint venture, and is an unprecidented suc-
cess in every sense of the wod. As a model for urban develop-
ments, it offers some helpful illustrations of how to put together
a quality product, while making a profit.
The purpose of this thesis is to articulate the nature
and advantages of public-private joint ventures, and to study
the Faneuil Hall project for its formula of success. The thesis
consists of a case history of the Marketplace, which traces the
steps and thought processes of the many actors. The case history
.3
is followed by an evaluation. The local merchants, city
planners, local lenders and developer were interviewed for
their comments about the project. The third section is a
comprehensive assessment of the range of impacts the project
has on the city of Boston. Fiscal and economic impacts are
measured and compared with alternative uses the property might
have been put to. Changes in land values, social and demo-
graphic changes, and transportation problems in the adjacent
areas are, in turn, discussed. And because of the political
prominence of the issue of' displacement, a separate section
examines incidence of displacement in the North End, and
discusses steps the city of Boston could be talking to ease
the pressures facing the North End.
Faneuil Hall is a fascinating project to study, because
of its success and because of the complexity in setting up
the deal. It succeeded despite gloomy predictions from nearly
everyone. For planners, an understanding of the development
process and of the risks involved can make a tremendous dif-
ference in one ts ability to plan effectively and to leverage
orivate investment for urban projects. This thesis is intended
to aid that understanding.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: Phillip L. Clay, PH.D.
Associate Professor of Urban Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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INTRODUCTION
Why Public/Private Joint Development Ventures?
Urban Planners have tested many styles of managing land
development, a few are shown below.
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Historically, the role of the public sector was strictly regula-
tory (far left). The city restricted certain kinds of develop-
ment through zoning and tax rates, and enforced building codes
and ordinances to assure that minimum quality standards were
met. The city was also involved in construction for its own
behalf. Beginning with city halls, public buildings and other
municipal facilities, the city acted as -developer, hiring the
contractors, designers, or requisitioning bids for the project
to be done for them. This mode is illustrated at the far right
of the continuum. With the advent of public housing in 1954,
the government became involved with construction for the non-
military, non-governmental sector (aside from its involvement
with roads and other infrastructure improvements. At first
public housing was built by government planners, (far right
fashion). Eventually development started moving more toward
the center, with two modes dominating. In the public sector,
Urban Renewal came into being, and the cities had funds to dis-
tribute for the aquisition of land and demolition of blighted
areas. The first method involved giving land to bidders who
promised to build on it in accordance to a fully developed urban
renewal plan for the area. The renewal authority in each town
determined exactly what they wanted on the site, and then made
arrangements for a developer to carry it out. This often in-
volved public investments in infrastructure and amenities on the
site. Environmental and social concerns led to the execution
of more control over private sector activities. In the second
mode the city utilized the EIR and other tools to gain design
review and some control over strictly private projects. Court
hearings and public forums were utilized to create obstacles
which often forced a developer to modify parts of the project
or face excessive delays. All four of these arrangements are
common today (and, of course, all stages between).
None of these models really involves cooperation of the
public and private sectors, it more closely resembles co-opera-
tion and power broking. Each mode because of some combative and
competitive elements pits the two against one another and often
increases the risk for at least one participant. For example,
the inflexibility of public projects often means that as mis-
takes appear they cannot be corrected in the rest of the pro-
ject. Adaptation of the project to market or other constraining
conditions is often not possible, thus the outcome of the pro-
duct is endangered. Similarly a developer can be forced to
yield on revisions until the viability is seriously question-
able.
A much more favorable relationship between the sectors is
that of joint-venture - a process of participation where each
sector sets some constraints and each benefits from the involve-
ment of the other. From the city's point of view, the pro's of
this kind of an arrangement are apparent: to gain more control
over the type and scale of investments and development activity,
to entice more resources through matching funds, to improve
12
to think more than twice: design and quality restrictions, de-
lays, and the mix and number of new personalities and agencies
which must be dealt with.
Stepping back from the situation a moment, it is clear that
in most instances, developer's goals and the city's objectives
are in harmony with one another. Both need an economically
viable project, both care that the development is not incom-
patible with surrounding areas, and both have a stake in the
quality of design. Developers tend to under emphasize this last
aspect. They often lean toward cost-cutting measures that may
tarnish the overall effect. But in the long run it is to their
advantage to produce a quality project of good design. The
experience of Rouse will show this.
City Hall, on the other hand, seems to downplay the impor-
tance of economic feasibility and delays. Delays can cost a
developer so much money he cannot proceed. Furthermore, if tax
rates make the project infeasible, it will not be built, or it
will not be tax-producing, because it will go into default. It
is just as important to the city as to the developer that the
projects be economically viable.
A city might want to become involved in development for one
or more of the following reasons: to rejuvenate the tax base,
to generate jobs for area residents, to contribute to the overall
economic health of the wider area, to contribute to the social,
visual, cultural, natural or other environmental qualities of an
area, to assure that negative impacts are minimized or avoided,
or to promote secondary considerations, like the city's public
image. With these as criteria, the keys to success are three-
fold:
1. Economic Viability of the Broject
2. Quality and Competence of Design
3. Sufficient and Far Sited Planning
Competent design has two elements: A. Site. speaifics well adopted
to the location and area's needs, in other words, seeing to it
that the project fits into the broader sense of the area; and
B. Generalwell designed such that floorplan promotes its func-
tion and the design enhances the area, internally and externally.
It is significant that these are the same elements which assure
a developer of success. This commonalxyof interests is the rea-
son I believe there is such potential in the venture model.
The structure of a joint-venture can take on any form.
Everything from mere financial assistance from city hall with
the developer in charge to a real team effort is conceivablc.
City designers might join the staff of architects and engineers
hired from the private sector; or perhaps a city hall representa-
tive or community body might have decision making authority on
an equal basis with the developer. (This is a somewhat radical
perspective.) The best arrangement depends on the project, the
people, the political situation at the time, the relative dis-
tribution of resources, and many other factors.
With Faneuil Hall Marketplace, the structure of the joint-
venture was along the former line. The city lost much of its
leveraging position through the lack of financial where-with-all,
and the general attitude in the business community at the time.
Jim Rouse came in, accepted the $11 million in public improve-
ments, negotiated a favorable tax/lease agreement, cooperated
with the BRA plan for the area, and listened to the project
planners, but then took more or less free reign. He was a re-
liable developer, with; a concern for quality product. He was
also teamed up with Ben Thompson, a local architect, who's per-
sonal committment and desire to see the project completed in the
best possible fashion were not to be equalled, even at the plan-
ning office of the BRA. The city was able to lend a hand in
convincing the most reluctant of the lenders to participate, and
the city also had a hand in the selling of the marketplace to
the Boston public, and the outside world. The mayor attended
every opening, and included the marketplace in publicity bro-
chures produced by the city thereafter. Many heard about the
marketplace at city hall's time and expense.
Rouse took the city out of a tight spot. The outcome was
a project that the city visited with much pride. His expertise
and connections were critical to the projects outcome. It was
a well functioning partnership.
Similar arrangements would be easy to establish in other
cities. The first steps would be: 1) setting planning objectives,
2) accounting for the resources and benefits the city has to
offer, and 3) thoroughly coming to understand the constraints
and concerns a developer would have with the proposed project.
Then planning and negotiations can begin. An agreement should
be sought which makes the best of what each party has to offer,
and takes into account the local situation. From there, living uP
to the comnittments remains. Because of the mutuality of
interests, the relationship can be smooth sailing if well
thought out. My views's on elements for a successful urban
redevelopment project are discussed more fully below. This dis-
cussion provides an interesting framework for examining the
Fanueil Hall Market case.
Elements of a Successful Urban Project
Planning - Planning is the comprehensive orchestration of the
fitting of the development pieces into the general scheme of
things. On the micro level, planning means design specifications
which are buildable, and aesthetically pleasing and functional
in that they encourage and support the activities which are to
go on there. (The latter is usually referred to as programming).
The access and egress consideratinns, determination of window-
size, shape and transparency are examples of design concerns.
The blend and arrangement of tenants (or units) within the space,
to assure best utilization of available area, and best social
environment for people are examples of programming issues.
Additional concerns on the micro level include, leasing arrange-
ments, management plans, and marketing strategy.
Design
Good design should be complimentary to the immediately ad-
jacent area and appropriate for the area as a whole. For
example, freeways do not belong in residential communities,
any more than an adobe hut belongsin New England. Neither makes
sense. Nor does a 40-story office tower make sense in a town
with no buildings larger than three stories. The context is
extremely important. Tastes are important. While they can be
influenced, and do change with time, they have a strong affect
on viability and affect potential consumers and users.
Good design is pleasant to look at, fun to be in and around,
easy to enter and to leave, and is functional as well. Often
functionalism is underplayed. Never underestimate the difference
a good functional plan can make, nor the damage a confusing or
obscure design and floor plan can do to marketability and
functioning. That is not to say that unconventional design will
never sell. On the contrary, as long as the plan makes sense,
and promotes the activities within, the sky is the limit.
I believe in creativity. I also believe that a good design
is appealing and memorable, and that creativity will enhance the
image of the project. If a design is sufficiently outstanding,
its attractiveness will offset additional costs under ordinary
circumstances, so why not build something a little nicer.
Economic Viability
Economic success depends on locating the right mix of
physical, market and psychological factors, and achieving a
proper interrelationship of revenues and expenses. Built space
must be leased or purchased, at least enough to cover debt ser-
vice on construction costs (fixed), expenses operating expenses
which includes a .(fixed portion and variable portion) and taxes.
Operating expenses are to a certain degree variable with how
much of the space is leased, for example, heating costs increase
as a foot of the space is utilized. However some costs are
fixed, like a minimum maintenance fee, replacement and repair
budget, and a management fee, and some costs increase as less
space is leased (realtor fees) are the primary example. To the
extent that fixed costs can be assumed by a moderate portion of
the cash flow, and other costs can be made to vary as a function
of income, the project is viable. This is why a 121 A agree-
ment which fluxuated as a function of income is of such interest
to developers. Then as income falls, so does tax assessment,
and the coverage ratio (the extent to which the area must be
leased or sold to cover fixed costs) drops.
Of course, the obvious key to economic viability is building
a good, marketable product to begin with. A well designed, well
constructed and well planned project does a lot for viability.
But inherent to real estate development are a lot of risks
which the developer can have no control over. Included among
them are tastes and preferences of consumers, macro-economic
forces and the general state of the local (and national) economy,
not to mention the cash position of local lenders. A developer
must guess, to the best extent possible what the market will be
commanding and how demanding that market will be. All design,
timing and cost considerations hinge on these estimations.
But beyond these guesses, the margin of safety is what the banks
and developer look to as assurance of viability. It is to a
developer's advantage to build in a city where infrastructure
is intact (reduces costs and risks), where tax payments can
fluxuate to some degree with his revenues, and where services
are good (including the package of "neighborhood" characteristics
for business, local eating and service establishments, for resi-
dential, the proximity and quality of schools, the availability
of good shopping and other amenities, and, of course the aesthe-
tic and economic characteristics of the area.)
Where buildings are already in place, but are not of the
highest economic use possible for the site, taking into consid-
eration the needs and uses in surrounding areas as well; then
the city and neighborhood cdn benefit from redevelopment, at
least in the economic sense of benefit. Where the cost of
aquisition and demolition is excessive to permit new construc-
tions, redevelopment is an alternative. Adaptive re-use is an
alternative to urban renewal, where the city could assemble
and clear parcels, to make them competitive with other (suburban)
locations. Economically and aesthetically, adaptive reuse or
redevelopment can make a lot of sense.
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On the macro level, far more is involved, and the effort
requires more guesswork and common sense. An image, and a
public appeal must evolve if the project is to be successful.
Physically, it should complement the surrounding areas, neither
outdating or making ai nuisance of what will surround it, nor
causing distortment or disorientation from poor sense of scale
or blending. Zoning was created to assure some common charac-
teristics along a street, for example, even setbacks. One build-
ing built up against the street'destroys the entire effect.
This is the concept of complimentarityy Contrast can be some
of the most complimentary design, creativity should not be
stifled. But some lines and forms should be observed, even in
introducing contrast, so the viewer is not disoriented.
Economically, the project must have a market. It can not
overlap existing services in the area, it should feed into on-
going activities. The atmosphere for the planned use must exist
in the area or be created within the development itself. It
does not do to build housing in the middle of an industrial park.
Within the larger area, environmental concerns, such as
sewer and water should be taken into account, open space and
wildlife, where appropiate, receive attention. The project's
full affect on the area, in less than obvious ways, as well,
should be considered. The physical infrastructure must be suf-
ficient; utilities must be supplied, or new lines extended to
supply the necessary requirements.' Questions should be asked
like: Will traffic be-affected? Will additional roads be
needed, and how about parking? This is macro level planning,
done by the city for every development, regardless of the city's
involvement in tae ieveloymdat ftself.
Timing may well be an important issue in planning. Changes
will occur as a result of development in the surrounding areas.
The use of parcels may change, repairs may be undertaken. On
the other extreme the value of property may decline. It depends
at least in part on how complimentary the proposed development
is.to existing uses. If changes are going to affect residents,
it is best to have some idea about how potential problems are
going to be mitigated prior to going ahead with construction.
If problems are unavoidable, perhaps another look at the project
is in order. Phasing is one way of minimizing impact, of testing
for real effects, and for permitting dabbling in something
new without committing to an entire project an unrevokable
license. Consideration of the market, physical state of the sur-
rounding area, and macro elements of the economy will give some
4indication whether now is the time to build at all. Phasing is
a valuable tool for planners and managers to utilize for control.
To summarize, planning concerns include:
- responsible, appropriate design
- sufficient zoning control
- adequate infrastructure including transportation access
and utilities
- economic viability of the proposed project
- spill over effects and areawide impacts
- complimentarity and timing
designs, to protect the interests of existing residents, to
create a desired environment, to improve the long-run health of
projects, and to correct for market inequities. The cons are not
so lengthy: it costs money and time, it encourages political
infighting among interest groups who struggle to affect the
project outcome, and planners must be willing to assume some
responsibility for the outcomes. The latter two can be consid-
ered pluses under some circumstances. They might very well
improve the outcome of the final product.
For developers, on the other hand, involvement with the city
is becoming more and more inevitable, because of the prolifera-
tion regulations, and the prospect of joint venturing is becom-
ing more and more.attractive as construction costs and risks
rise. Joint-venturing may reduce equity requirements and expo-
sure, it may reduce total cost to the developer, it may improve
cash flow (or stability of cash flow, as with Section 8 subsidy
guarantees,,(and might improve overall profitability. It often
results in better products through increased city participation
and public criticism of the designs. This may make for better
long-run investments. And, of course, partnership creates an en-
vironment- for harmonious co-existence, with favorable tax
agreements, and good city services. These advantages are sub-
stantial.
The cons to developing in partnership with city hall are
not Very numerous, but are sufficient to cause a developer
Paper Oraanization
The Faneuil Hall Marketplace case study follows. The case
is presented chronologically, although occasionally topics are
concentrated for clarity of idea.
The second section is an evaluation of the development by
involved participants. Attitudes and lessons showed by Rouse
Company personnel, city hall representatives, lenders, store
merchants and others are presented.
The third section is an assessment of the impacts of the
project. Impacts are discussed'in the context of the city of
Boston, (sometimes of the region as a whole), with special at-
tention to impacts on the North End, as this is where many of
the potentially negative impacts fall. Displacement, because it
is an issue of late, is discussed with reference to the North
End in the concluding passage of the impact assessmont section.
The fourth and final section presents my evaluation of the
Faneuil Hall Marketplace project, grades the performance of each
actor and raises a few policy issues with respect to public/
private joint ventures. Discussion of the use of Faneuil Hall
Marketplace as a model completes the thesis.
Case history
/Courtesy of The Rouse Company
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Urban Renewal in Boston
In order to fully understand the context in which Rouse
undertook his activities, the climate of urban renewal in the
city of Boston, some history of the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA), mayoral politics, and demographic trends are needed. That
material is presented first.
In 1957, the BRA was founded to undertake planning under
federal Urban Renewal authorization. In Boston, the BRA replaced
the city planning board, and undertook planning for all of Boston
besides doing planning for each urban renewal project. The first
executive director was Kane Simionian. Under his guidance the
Authority planned and initiated the West End project - demolition
of an entire inner city neighborhood. Nearly 1000 structures,
were replaced with luxury apartment buildings, institutional
facilities and office buildings with some land sold on the open
market. This project was well underway when Mayor Collins was
elected in 1960. In his campaign, Collins had promised to build
a "New Boston". To coordinate the effort, he brought in Ed Logue,
of New Haven Urban Renewal claim. Logue quickly expanded the
BRA staff, bringing in talented people from across the United
States, then asked for and received planning grants from H.U.D.
(The Department of Housing and Urban Development) to study 10
project areas simultaneously. Logue was well connected in
Washington, through President Kennedy and it showed. Standard
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procedure in other cities was to study, and then undertake one
neighborhood at a time. 7
Logue divided Boston into 11 target areas, each had its own
project director and staff. (see map included in the appendix)
Each area project team worked as an autonomous unit in the BRA.
Each had their own architects, planners, engineers, and staff.
Inter-area coordination was not emphasized. Much of the core
area of Boston was included in the urban renewal plans; a' "ew
Boston"was indeed what they had in mind.
The West End clearance was an unpopular project, and the
memories of destroyed housing were vivid in Bostonian's minds,
especially in the North End and Charlestown, the two adjacent
neighborhoods. Accordingly, the waterfront and central business
district projects were designed to avoid housing demolition.
The boundaries of these areas were carefully drawn to avoid any
residential portions. This was a deliberate political move.
The North End was badly in need of revitalization. It was sur-
rounded on two sides by decaying, outdated, trade, industry and
commercial facilities. The waterfront was dangerous, a place
where many of Boston's unsightlies resided. If the North End
was to retain its population these areas would have to be renewed.
The Waterfront/Faneuil Hall plan was approved by HUD in August
of 19 64, the sixth to gain approval. All-ten plans were approved
and operating by mid 1967.
Between 1950 and 1960 the North End had lost 26.8 percent
of its population, as compared to a 13 percent population loss
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city-wide. It was the only neighborhood in Boston where no new
construction had been undertaken in the ten year period.2 The
North End was the smallest residential neighborhood, and was
decisively Italian. In 1960 nearly 70 percent of the residents
were foreign born.3 The residents had the third lowest incomes
in the city trailing only the South End and Roxbury. Although
housing was inexpensive in the neighborhood, the need for more
low income housing was fairly acute. But the dilapidated busi-
ness areas adjacent to the neighborhood were to be the focus
of renewal activity in the area.
The Downtown Waterfront, Faneuil Hall plan, which will be
discussed in more detail later, called for aquisition and demoli-
tion of 211 structures, many of which were vacant. Rehab was
slated for 222 structures in the area. The clearance would make
room for creation of open space along the water. Residential
construction (nearly 2000 units were planned), and revitalization
of the area's commercial uses were emphacized. Subsidized units
were set aside for the back lots, to aid the North End's housing
shortage, and front lots were designated to luxury apartments
and condominium construction. It was not clear at the time how
marketable these units would be, but it was hoped that they would
serve as catalysts to the overall revitalization of the area.
In 1966, Mayor Collins ran for Senate, and was resoundingly
defeated. He lost badly in most of the Boston precincts. His
urban renewal projects were doing more demolition than reconstruc-
tion, and'relocatibon of displaced households was becoming a major
problem. In 1967, Logue resigned to run for mayor. He was
defeated in the primary by Kevin White, who then went on to beat
segregationist Louise Day Hicks for the Mayoral seat. White
ran on a "neighborhood" platform, promising to turn urban renewal
around, so that it serviced the areas it was then destroying.
Francis Cuddy had been appointed interim director of the BRA in
1967. Mayor White appointed Hale Champion to replace him
as soon as he was into office.
The summer of 1968, riots broke out in several neighborhoods
in Boston. A focus of the demonstrations was a plea for construc-
tion of low and moderate income housing in the urban renewal
neighborhoods. At that time the Faneuil Hall M4arketplace plan
had not yet been approved in Washington, and that fall President
Nixon came into office.
In 1966, on the Waterfront, 32 units of (luxury) housing
were at last under construction, and 350 units -of 221(d)3 subsidy
had been committed to the area. The completion date was still
scheduled for August of 1969. The Waterfront staff, concerned
about the change in political climate in Washington, scurried to
get applications to H.U.D. before the new administration took
office, and were, for the most part, successful.
By this time the BRA staff had grown from the 81 in 1961,
when Lpgue came to Boston, to nearly 500 by 1968. Champion
planned some staff reductions and a reorganization; the mayor
wanted more control over BRA operations. The staff reductions
were opposed bitterly, but the Mayor supported Champion, and
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the courts upheld the decision by refusing to hear the case. The
year was torn by turmoil, inside city hall and out in the neigh-
borhoods.
Champion remained head of the BRA until August, 1969, at
which point he left to develop a new town outside the Twin Cities,
Minnesota. His tenure at the BRA was a period marked with strife,
which would result in some changes in BRA policies. Nationally,
housing was becoming the dominant urban issue, especially with
respect to provision of low income housing for the poor. Dis-
placement of residents was another big national issue, and in
response, HUD increased its relocation assistance allocations to
cities. John Warner became head of the BRA in September of 1969,
formerly the commissioner of the City of Boston parks department.
Under his short directorship, many of the priorities were shifted.
Low and moderate income housing construction was initiated, and
new forms of community review processes were toyed with. He
left in January of 1971 to go into private consulting.
Warner was replaced by Robert Kenney, former commissioner
of Public Facilities for the city. Kenney remained in office
until January of 1977, seeing through most of the Fneuil Hall
Marketplace development process. Under his control, the BRA did
a great deal of site improvement work, and the focus shifted to
cooperation with the private sector to get projects up. Nation--
ally, government programs and funding were moving in that
direction, and by 1973, Nixon had put a moratorium on new
housing subsidies. At the time, most of the Boston renewal
projects were just gearing up for their most intense periods of
housing construction and rehabilitation. Many of their efforts
were frustrated by Nixon administration actions.
Since Kenney, two directors have headed the BRA: Robert
Walsh, from January of 1977 to July of 1978, and the present head,
Robert Ryan, who became director in September of 1978. Both
Kenney and Walsh resigned to go into private consulting work.
Kevin White was reelected twice since his election in 1967, and
is still mayor today.
By 1979, few of the eleven projects are completed. HUD has
ordered a close-out of all urban renewal programs, so they can
get a final accounting on dollar allocations, and so that the
transition to more modern urban programs will be complete. The
Waterfront/Faneuil Hall project is near termination. The Market-
place is completed and in operation, and so are the commercial
areas on the wharves. Over 1600 units of housing have been
built or are under construction, quite close to the original
expectations. This lines up well vis a vis the other projects.
In fact, the Waterfront/Faneuil Hall project is often considered
the most successful of all of Boston's Urban Renewal efforts.
7TSh storya o the deveopment Of the Foneuil H1l Narke1lacde
.,ll~ows, below.-
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The Quincy Market-Faneuil Hall Plan
In 1964 Boston was far from a chic, cosmospolitan city of
resurging neighborhoods. As Time Magazine set the scene:
"(Boston) was clearly in a bad way. Its symptoms
included: 1. a central business district tottering
toward skid row, where 14,000 jobs and $78 million
of taxable assessment had evaporated in a decade:
2. A moribund waterfront; and 3. Two fumbling
attempts at renewal by Collins' predecessor that
had turned out to be unmitigated disasters. (The
west end clearance and the John F. Fitzgerald
Expressway) "6
The residents had voted for change. Among the Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority's (BRA) priorities for rebuilding the downtown
area was the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall district. It
linked the new and developing Government Center and established
retail and financial districts with the North End residential
community and the Boston Harbor (A map showing adjacent areas
is included in the appendix to this report). The Central Artery
created a fairly formidable barrier and a serious visual impact.
At that time it did not make much difference because the Quincy
Market was a rat-infested, declining area people ordinarily did
not pass through. The area.was in dire need of attention.
The QuiIcy Building, built for Mayor Josiah Quincy as the
town market in 1823, was a splendid structure 535 feet long,
made primarily of granite and glass, with laminated wood ribs and
a copper dome. It was done in Greek revival style. Consistent
with the plans of its Architect, Alexander Parris, North .and
South Market buildings were constructed, during the next decade
by individual proprietors. In all 45 brick buildings, in row
styl% went up on both sides. The marketplace was built on fill
at the water's edge, adjacent to Faneuil Hall (constructed in
1742, the original townmeetingplace. The Mayor's intent was
to centralize Boston's wholesale, distributing and warehousing
activities. In 1920 the Markets were the site of one of the
first major urban renewal efforts. They were cleaned up and
restored so as to serve the community for another 40 years. In
1959 there was talk at city hall of tearing the structures down.
The shipping industry had moved away from Boston's waterfront.
The market was functionally obsolete but talk of razing the
structures brought objections from historic preservationists and
local architects.
By 1960 the decision had been reached not to demolish the
ancient structures. Aside from their historical and sentimental
value to the community, they were architectural relics considered
by some to be the finest example of 19th Century Greek Revivial
architecture in this country. But as plans for the core of
Boston were being developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's,
economics was becoming more and more important. It was essen-
tial that the downtown become a viable economic center, or it
seemed inevitable that Boston would die. The BRA was at a loss
for what to do with the property.
Coinciding with the times, the notfon of adaptive remuse began
emerging. Ben Thompson and others in the architectural community,
believed that it was too costly, and indeed, wasteful to set
aside historic monuments as museums. They believed that these
structures could be adapted to suit modern lifestyles and needs
without sacrificing the architectural character of the building.
It was referred to as functional historic preservation.
In 1964,. when the Urban Renewal Guidelines were established
and approved for the Waterfront/Faneuil Hall district, the city
invited proposals for the properties which encompassed this
concept. A design competition was held, several entries were
submitted. The basic goals and objectives which the design was
to meet were as follows, (as set forth by the 1964 Urban Renewal
Plan):
General Design Principles (for the area as a whole)
1. To mitigate the effect of the elevated expressway and the
surface roadway beneath as a physical and psychological
barrier to effective connections and linkages between the
downtown and the waterfront.
2. To establish an active urban character for the area by the
intensive utilization of land and by the mixing of compatible
land uses.
3. To provide maximum opportunity for pedestrian access to the
water's edge.
4. To establish an orderly sequence and hierarchy of open
spaces and views for both the pedestrian and the motorist.
5. To establish a relationship between buildings, open spaces
and public ways which provides maximum protection to the
pedestrian during unfavorable weather conditions.
6. To achieve a proper integration of buildings and spaces by
a careful relationship of scale and materials in new develop-
ment to the scale and materials of the architecturally and
historically significant buildings to be retained.
7. To establish a continuity of scale between the existing North
End residential community and the new development to take
place adjacent to the North End and along the water's edge,
north of Commercial Wharf.
8. To maintain the finger-like outline of the wharves.
9. To create an unobstructed visual channel from the Old State
House at Washington and State Streets down to Long Wharf
and the harbor beyond.
10. To establish at the foot of State Street a vehicular free
focal point of converging pedestrian ways and down-harbor
views.
Sub-Area Design Objectives - Faneuil Hall-Blackstone Market
This area is one of the most valuable historic assets to the
City of Boston, to the State of Massachusetts, and to the
Nation. Within this area are buildings that date from the
early eighteenth to the twentieth century.
It is intended that the historic uniqueness of this area be
retained through a thoughtful blend of new construction, re-
habilitation and conservation. The complex of structures
defined by Faneuil Hall, Quincy Market, and the North and
South Market Street buildings is considered by leading archi-
tects and historians as one of the finest urban spaces in
America.
The architectural and spatial relationship formed by this com-
plex is intended to act as the historic pedestrian and visual
connection, starting from Beacon Hill, through the new Govern-
ment Center, into the space around Faneuil Hall Square, and
the proposed new building in Parcel E-10 be so designed that
the intimate pedestrian scale that once existed in this area
again be recaptured.
Retention of those uses which are compatible with the object-
ives of the renewal plan, such as restaurants, retail food
stores and the traditional weekend push-cart market is desire-
able. Introduction of new general business, institutional,
office and residential uses which serve to up-grade the area
and create an active pedesttian link, maximizing pedestrian
protection under unfavorable weather conditions, between the
Government Center and the Waterfront are to be encouraged.
Rehabilitation of the buildings must be carefully done so that
the exteriors do not hide their age nor their historic impor-
tance, while the interiors are updated to new and active uses.
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New buildings constructed must carefully relate in mass,
building material and scale to the existing buildings in the
area.7
Ben Thompson responded with a modern and functional plan
for a festive market which deferred to the architectural-character-
istics of the previous era with these exceptions: he favored
evening the roof lines so that all buildings in the North and
South Markets were of equal height, and he wanted to enclose and
extend the canopies of the Quincy building out into the streets,
which he envisioned closed. Thompson's design was selected, but
his ideas about how to properly restore the markets spurred some
discussion among concerned Bostonians. Thompson had said of
preservations
"Great architecture and great cities have always been tested
by their adaptability to change. Like religions and races
of people, buildings and cities die out if they cannot adapt
to new conditions. Many great buildings have thus been lost;
the perceived alternative to destruction has been conversion
to a preserved "monument" - empty, functionless, to be looked
at rather than lived in. In America, the Mt. Vernons and
Monticellos are now portraits of an immobile past. Yet America
cannot continue to afford such subsidized museums for the sake
of preservation. If our efforts to save the texture of the
past are to have any permanent impact, we must weave historic
structu es back into the fabric of the city with unprecedented
skill.
He advocated two rules of restoration (generally accepted today,
but vigorously debated during the 1960's):
1. Do not attempt to improve on history; do not "restore
back" to a fixed cut-off date; because history is richer
in time than any one period or style.
2. When repair or replacement of building elements is required,
new material should be subtlely distinguished from the
original. If such distinctions are not made, the genuine-
ness of the original is confused, and the viewer's percep-
tion of time is confused.
Thompson referred to other forms of restoration as "sentimental
falsifications".9
Thompson's design called for a bustling and innovative retail
center, (large and international with no major tenants). It was
unlike anything done in-a central city before. Many Bostonians
were cautious about tampering with the structure, and some were
suspicious of Thompson's plan. These hesitations prompted the
BRA to commission a comprehensive study of the marketplace from
Architectural Heritage, Inc. and the Society for the Preservation
of New England Antiquities. The study addressed itself to more
than merely historic and architectural issues. There were five
volumes prepared in all, including one on marketability and econ-
omic feasibility, and one exclusively devoted to engineering
details.
The five-volume study presented a range of findings and re-
commendations, foremost of which was restoration of the Markets
to the way they were in the 1820's. Other findings and recom-
mendations are outlined below.
Historic Preservation
- The exterior was to be renovated to resemble the original
facade. The interior was to combine the best of the old
design with modern technology.
- A.historic (or architectural) district should be created in
the market area to control the markets' environment.
- The two small buildings (part of Parris's original design,
but since demolished) should be reconstructed to serve as
entrance and focal point to the market area.
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- Public involvement was considered essential. They recom-
mended 1) City ownership, 2) a National Advisory Council,
and 3) responsibility for rehabilitating Quincy Market's
Great Hall given to a citizen's group.
Engineering, Development and Marketability
- Novel heating and cooling systems using sewage were recom-
mended. Six or seven buildings in the North row needed to
be replaced to conform with the city building codes.
- The property should be leased to a developer, who would re-
novate-the interior and.manage the property. Possible 121-A
tax agreement. The developer should be selected through a
strenuous design competition with input from outside the
design committee.
Marketability was considered to be extremely good, given
the market's proximity to Government Center, the Financial
District and the Freedom Trail.
Exterior work could be completed by September 1, 1969 and
completion of the interior and site improvements was deemed
possible by the fall of 1970.
The Architectural Heritage study noted that under Title I of the
1949 Housing Act, as amended in 1966, restoration of "properties
of historic or architectural value" were eligible for special
urban renewal project improvement funds. For structures desig-
nated for private use, only work on structural stability, exter-
ior restorations and site improvements were eligible. Certain
aspects of the restoration were eligible for other research
and/or demonstration grants totalling about $300,000. The study's
estimates for total cost of the project as they prescribed
were as follows:
Total costs of renovation: $10.00 million
Architects fees and overhead: 1.75 million
Acquisition and Relocation of
Central Wharf East building: .15 million
Total -11.90 million
Total Cost $11.90 million
Anticipated revenues for
the life of the project: $ 8.50 million
Balance $ 3.40 million
Federal grant . . . . $2.00 million
City share . . . . . .$1.40 million
Acting on their recommendation, the Waterfront project staff made
an application for federal funds, with the study as a basis.
The proposal was approved by HUD in 1969, but actual work on the
exterior did not begin until the summer of 1972. A battle en-
sued over the selection of a developer, and then there were pro-
blems getting off the ground.
The First Effort
The BRA distributed developer's kits on a set of specifi-
cations for a version of the Marketplace which closely resem-
bled the Architectural Heritage proposal. Bids were received
in October of 1970. Three architect/developer teams submitted
proposals: Ben Thompson with the Van Arkle-Moss Company of
Philadelphia; Simon Mintz with Architectural Heritage and Roger
Webb Associates (a local firm); and Fred Mahoney (a local developer)
teamed with Wurster, Bernardi and Emmons, the architects of
Ghiradelli Square in San Francisco. Ghiradelli Square was an
adaptive re-use retail center that had experienced tremendous
success. It was smaller, however, than the Boston project and
catered to a young craft-seeking crowd. The Waterfront staff
felt that a local firm should be awarded the contract. However,
there was a question about the legality of Architectural
L0
Heritage's participation in the competition since under HUD
regulations it is not permissible for a developer to enter a
bid on a project for which it had drawn the specifications.
While the entry was eventually judged legal, in the end Van
Arkle-Moss won the competition. The Waterfront staff was bitter
about the decision, because they favored Roger Webb-Architectural
Heritage.
Financing the construction plans turned out to be a consid-
erable problem. Known for conservatism and reluctance towards
urban lending, the Boston banks did not rush to backathe project.
Public funds for the loan were unavailable, and there was a
legal snag - it is next to impossible for a developer to obtain
financing for a parcel which he does not own outright. A con-
dition of the HUD historic preservation award was that the city
retain ownership of the structures to assure their preservation
as historic monuments. Most potential financing sources felt
that there was not a suitable legal arrangement regarding owner-
ship to protect their investment. After more than a year the
developer was still unable to secure financing, from any source.
In January of 1972, the Van Arkle-Moss team was "de-designated"
for breach of contract; they were unable to meet the BRA's sche-
dule for a construction start.
The.-Boston -Globe and the Herald American were following these
developments quite closely. Earlier in the year the city fathers
had abandoned plans to build the bicentennial exhibit on some
islands in the harbor. Instead the Mayor had announced that the
Waterfront would be the center of the bi-centennial celebration.
With this pronouncement it became imperative that the Marketplace
be restored and occupied prior to that date. Anxious to get
started, the city began negotiations with local contractors.
The BRA was prepared to initiate the exterior rehabilitation
without a developer.
Involvemnentof the Rouse Company
Although many years had passed since the outset, Ben Thomp-
son was not finished with the project yet. With six years
already invested in the project, he went out searching for a
developer with the financial where-with-all and the track re-
cord of success needed to pull off the project. He spoke to
many developers before he landed the key combination of skills
and willingness to assume risks. He found it with the Rouse
Company, of Columbia, Maryland. The Rouse Company was an un-
usual outfit. "To improve the physical environment and the
quality of urban life available to the people in the United
10States" is among their primary corporate objectives. The
Rouse Company had a reputation as a very successful shopping
center developer, with 26 projects scattered across the country
and several large scale residential developments as well. They
were best known for their largest undertaking, the construction
and planning of a New Town - Columbia, Maryland - where their
corporate headquarters are now located. Columbia is a planned
community for 100,000 built up from the farmland. At the
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suggestion of a local developer, Thompson invited Jim Rouse to
come up to have a look at the site and to discuss the idea.
Thompson had prepared elaborate and encouraging feasibility
studies; but a marketplace of this scale in a downtown location
had never been attempted, so his figures were not considered
entirely reliable. To top it off this plan had already been
beseiged with set-backs. By this time more than the banks had
grown skeptical about the future of the project. To bankers
and businessmen alike, Thompson's design scheme seemed naive,
Conventional wisdom about shopping centers centered around the
concept of "anchor stores" - large, stable, well-known depart-
ment or grocery stores (preferably chain stores). These other
stores would serve as population magnets, drawing shoppers for
the benefit of the smaller stores (who paid higher rents per
square foot for the right to a location near anchors). The
Thompson design called for no major tenants, instead it relied
strictly on local artisans and craftspersons, small food dealers
and restaurants. Bankers cringed, these shops are the greatest
credit risks of all. In the Quincy building, Thompson preferred
that the indoor street be kept, and the entire building be re-
tained in its original theme: food. (Food was generally avoided
by shopping center developers.) Small fresh fruit, meat, bakery
and other vendors would display their wares, and the personal
merchant-to-customer contact of earlier eras would be re-enacted.
His idea sounded nice: (but infeasible)
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"Rejecting the mass production mentality of most American
commercial areas, emphasis in the Faneuil Hall markets
will be on high quality and unique character in varied
price ranges."ll
People honestly believed he would lose his shirt.
Jim Rouse, the principal in his Mortgage Banking and Develop-
ment firm, was a known risk taker, with an acute sense of social
responsibility, and most importantly, a record of successes.
Many considered him a visionary, with an eye for potential.
By any standards he was a competent and conscientious business-
man. Thompson knew that if he could persuade Rouse to join him,
the marketplace would be built and top quality would be assured.
On Rouse's first visit to Boston to have a look at the site
he agreed to pursue it. Why he saw potential in Boston is
worthy of discussion.1 2
Rouse had been looking for a downtown location. He wanted
to try his hand at downtown development based on his social con-
cern for urban areas and his belief in a strong economic future
for central cities. Of all the sites he had been offered, Boston
was the most encouraging, and the Faneuil Hall site had the most
going for it. Location was the key. "I was impressed with the
development of the waterfront, the proposed new $3.5 million
park, the Mercantile Building, the financial district and the
nearness of City Hall,"1 3 says Rouse. Wedged between two of
the BRA's most ambitious projects, the $230 million Government
Center and the $125 million Waterfront Redevelopment project,
the market would be right in the center of a larger, newly
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improved area. The area was surrounded by office buildings,
a source of plentiful daytime shoppers. Nearby was a stable
residential neighborhood, which was growing on the high income
end. Boston was historically a walking city, and this fact
would work to the advantage of a marketplace which was conven-
iently located. Rouse also noted the proximity of public trans-
portation facilities. The expressway had an exit feeding into
the project, and there were some conveniently located parking
facilities (in particular the new Government Center garage.)
Both modes of transportation were critical for generating addi-
tional customers for weekends and evenings.
Also influential in Rouse's decision were the buildings
themselves. The buildings were architecturally magnificent, and
in fairly good repair. A final design was already prepared and
had passed inspection at city hall. He thought it was a good
design. In addition, the area already had a history as a market-
place. Rouse's undertaking would be more of a resurgence of
tradition than the imposition of a new land use in the area.
The economics seemed to be there. Still, undertaking the pro-
ject was extremely risky, others had turned away. Rouse under-
stood why others had serious doubts, but he took a harder look.
Ben Thompson believed he could create a European style
marketplace and that it would be a success. He was quite sure
of the projects economic viability. And Thompson was a proven
businessman and entrepeneur. Design Repearch, his innovative
retail establishment was a tremendous success in both Cambridge
and San Francisco locations, and his Harvest restaurant is a
Cambridge favorite. Besides, Thompson was respected in Boston
circles, and a partner like that could prove invaluable when
working in a new city, especially one as parochial as Boston.
Rouse was impressed with Thompson, and thought his ideas would
go over well. A partnership was born.
Packaging the Deal
Rouse and Thompson went to work immediately on developing
a final proposal to submit to the City. Under their plan the
Rouse Company would take full charge of renovation, leasing,
management and operations. They would lease the land from the
city, and find private financing sources. Thompson would be
retained to 1) oversee construction, to assure the historic
quality and architectural integrity were retained, 2) help with
the masterplanning of the marketplace environment, and 3) do the
final details of the design work. Rouse would be sole or pre-
dominant owners of the project. Thompson would be rewarded for
his efforts with a fee and a small piece of equity in the pro-
ject.
They developed Thompson's original proposal, attending to
many of the details. For example, decisions were made as to the
extent of restoration to be done on columns, wood rafters and
bricks. And they decided to provide central heating, but not
air conditioning. (An open air environment was considered pre-
ferrable to climate control.) The city would want to know
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exactly what they would be getting in return -for-a long term
lease committment, and Rouse knew it would pay to work out the
economics and planning ahead of time. They revised the cost
estimates, taking into account this level of detail, and passed
these figures around. They were well prepared for interroga-
tion and negotiation. Projected income streams were developed,
and they looked generous but, of course this would help with
the tax deal and with financing (more on these topics later).
A formal application was submitted in August of 1972.
Negotiations with the city were a lengthy and discouraging
process. The city was no longer so urgent in its search for a
developer. In the interim,. the BRA had located a contractor to
begin work on the exteriors of the buildings. Despite the out-
break of several fires in the Quincy building, it looked as
though there would finally be some progress. At city hall other
uses for the site, were being considered, including one proposal
for a hotel complete with overpasses connecting the three build-
ings. The property disposition and use were far from certain.
Although the BRA still had clear goals with respect to comple-
tion dates in the backs of their minds, they wanted to make sure
they found the best use for the buildings. They met frequently
with Thompson and Rouse, to make sure all understood the costs
and advantages of the proposal.
Community approval of the project was not needed. The
boundaries of the Waterfront/Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal district
had been carefully drawn to exclude any residential portions.
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This was done for two reasons. As a result of the recent West
End experience, all of the central city neighborhoods were leery
of Urban Renewal. The city made a concerted effort to avoid
raising fears in the North End, and one important way of doing
so was to deliberately exclude all residential parcels from the
urban renewal plan. The second reason for exclusion was politi-
cal (but pragmatic) from an implementation standpoint. It meant
that under Urban Renewal guidelines community review was not
required. So, while residents of the North End had considerable
interest in what was being developed at Faneuil Hall, they had
no formal mechanism, short of their elected representatives, for
inputting to the decision making or planning process. The city
fathers had to be convinced.
The BRA and mayoral representatives had three specific pro-
blems with designating The Rouse Company as developer. First,
it was not a local firm. The concensus was that these contracts
should be awarded to local firms, if at all possible. Roger
Webb (who renovated Old City Hall) approached the city again in
the midst of Rouse's negotiations. They considered him quite
seriously, but his experience in large scale development was too
limited to justify choosing him over the Rouse Company. He
planned to lease the space through local realtors, whereas the
Rouse Company planned to handle the leasing themselves. The
latter arrangement meant the city could exert considerably more
control over the final outcome.
The Second concern was that Rouse was a suburban shopping
center developer. While his projects were far from tidky-tacky,
locals were leery of giving away their precious historic monu-
ments to a developer known for his abilities to manufacture
profitable centers.
Third, the firm had never operated in New England. Some
protested that Rouse people would not be able to work with the
financial and political community, others feared they would not
be sensitive to the New England market and social climate. From
a practical standpoint, The Rouse Company was exactly what the
BRA needed. They had experience, expertise, financial backing
and staying power. Politically, however, there were some pro-
blems with designating them. It was a help that Rouse was linked
up with Ben Thompson. Thompson was an old time Bostonian, and
a local architect. He had invested a lot of effort in this pro-
ject. He understood the importance of historic preservation,
and assured the community he would personally oversee the detail-s;
In his other ventures, Thompson had demonstrated that innovative
does not necessarily mean destructive, and it certainly does not
necessitate failure. Thompson and Rouse were vigorous sales-
men, and it paid off. Eventually they convinced the 6ity of the
merits of their plan. The process took six months. In March
of 1973 The Rouse Company was designated developer of the Faneuil
Hall Marketplace. They began immediately with lease and tax
negotiations, and with their quest for financing. It would be 14
months before a mutually agreeable tax/lease agreement was to be
signed, and 9 months more before the financing was settled. In
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those two years costs were to increase nearly fifty perc-ent.
The Tax-Lease Agreement
The negotiation of the tax/lease agreement was a strategic,
competitive process. Each actor tried to get all that his client
could, while the clock was ticking away precious minutes. The
city was locked into a bi-centennial deadline, and had to reach
a compromise in time for the developer to finish on schedule.
The developer had to sign the lease with the City before leases
with the tenants could be drawn, and the banks wanted 30,000
square feet (out of 85,000 total) of retail area in the Quincy
Market to be leased prior to the mortgage committment. Time
meant money. "The delays were unbearable," recalls one Rouse
aid. "The city gets paid while it sits the process out, we have
carrying costs on the money we have tied up in a project, and
don't start to see our return until the project is entirely
finished." 1 Still, neither side gave in very easily. Roy
Williams, the project director, and attorneys John Steele and
Phillip Fine represented Rouse in the negotiations; BRA head
Robert Kenny, financial advisor, Stuart Forbes and attorneys
Charles Speleotis and Edward Longergan represented the city of
Boston.
The negotiations dealt with more issues than simply how much
Rouse would pay in taxes. The Rouse Company wanted to lease the
adjacent lot to be developed into parking and extra storage space,
but the city wanted to offer the land to a local developer.
As part of its agreement the BRA promised to see that a major
garage was built on the perimeter of the project. As negotia-
tions pressed on the project contractors involved in exterior
repairs were falling behind schedule; HUD had refused to put
up any more money; so the city was digging inhto its own pocket
to finish the exterior rehabilitation (something it could not
afford to do in 1974). Rouse assumed the risks in the structural
repairs contract, and did some construction work which was pre-
viously to have been done by the city. The Rouse Company also
agreed to fund and to install Boston's bicentennial exhibit in
the dome and atrium of the Quincy building (known as the Great
Hall). In return for this favor a prearranged payment in lieu of
tax agreement. was established for the construction and initial
"shake-down" period of three years. Small, fixed amounts would
be paid for these three years before the full tax agreement would
go into affect.
Unlike more recent projects, there were no restrictions about
who would be hired to do the construction work. But Rouse plan-
ned to hire the Hunneman construction company (a local firm) and
was planning to lease predominantly to local establishments any-
way. There were about a dozen tenants still operating out of the
Quincy market. They would be permitted to stay after renovations,
if they wished, and would not face rent increase for a least
three years.
The agreement that was finally reached called for 20 percent
of gross revenue from office and retail space to be paid to the
city as rent and property taxes. The percentage increased on
gross income in excess of $3 million, $4 million and $5 million,
but was not to exceed 25 percent of gross income all totalled.
During the construction period payments would be $200,000 and
$400,000 the end of the first and second years of operation,
respectively.. The abatement period ended 10 months after the
third stage's opening. The lease term was for 99 years, suf-
ficient to cover the risk on a 40 year mortgage.
At the signing of the deal, Stuart Forbes estimated that
within five years the Marketplace would be generating in excess
of $1 million in taxes per year. Others were not so optimistic.
Robert Farrell of the BRA Board made it clear he thought the
project would never get off the ground.1 5 Others thought the
deal was a sham. In a recent BRA publication, the city complained
about their current yearly average of $300,000 in tax revenue
as compared to the $2,300,000 picked up by the state last year
in sales tax alone.16 While it is true that because the size
of sales and income taxes levied at the state level, revenues
to the state will outpace city revenues 3.5 to 1, even after the
fixed payment period, the city does not have much to complain
about with tax payment of $1.15 to $1.5 million per year. When
the tax dollars start rolling in they will be even out of Forbe's'
ballpark - even he underestimated the project's potential success.
In 1968, Ghiradelli Square in San Francisco was breaking all
sales volume records, with sales of $200 per square foot. (Typi-
cal for shopping centers is $50-75 per square foot) In the
first year alone, sales for food merchants in the Quincy Market
exceeded $300 per square foot. Now they are nearly $400, the
highest in the world.17 With tax payments linked to rents
(which are a function of sales), this could turn out to be a
real breadwinner from the city's fiscal standpoint. The fiscal
impact of the project is analyzed in more detail later.
Financing the Project
Rouse had a group of lenders with whom he had done other
projects, and from this group he was able to receive committ-
ments for financing of Faneuil Hall. Within two months of the
signing of the lease the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Associa-
tion Trust, (TIAA) promised $21 million in permanent financing.
At the time that was the best guess at the cost of developing
the whole project. Although they had full confidence in Rouse;
they were a little concerned about the marketability of the con-
cept. They suggested to Rouse that he might want to phase the
project, just to play it safe. At this point he did nothing
with the suggestion.
Construction financing was.a matter of considerably more
acrobatics. Chase Manhattan, who had financed Rouse projects
before, came forward within two weeks of the TIAA promise, with
a cominittment for half of the interim financing. Chase wanted
an effective rate of 16 percent on their money, plus a kicker;
it was 1974, and the money market was tight. While no one was
thrilled about the rate, it seemed to be the best that could be
obtained. There was an additional stipulation to the Chase
committment: the Boston lending community had to come up with
the other half. Chase felt that a local committment was essen-
tial to protect their interest in the project.
The Boston banks were not cooperative. As a group they did
not approve of the unc-onventional leasing scheme, and questioned
the concept of retailing in an urban area. In response to their
concern over the lack of anchor stores to serve as magnets,
Rouse and Thompson explained that "the"way the stores were located
in the space in its entirety would be the magnet".1 8 The banks
were far from sold on the idea. They did not trust the cost
estimates, because rehabilitation is difficult to estimate.
Moreover, they were not impressed with The Rouse Company's finan-
cial solvency. 1974 had been a tough year for Columbia. The
recession hit the housing industry hard; Rouse was showing red
from some of their residential undertaking and from high expenses.
The value of Rouse Company stock had plumetted (an order of mag-
nitude), and their corporate future was uncertain. Connecticut
General, the principal lender in Columbia had stepped in to pro-
tect their investment. Corrective measures were being taken at
Rouse, to minimize Columbia losses. But in light of the general
real estate climate, and their other concerns, the Boston banks
and other financial institutions had little desire to lend.
The first local bankers to step forward were two officers
of the First National Bank of Boston. They made the suggestion
of a consortuim of lenders. It would help minimize the risk,
from the lenders' point of view, and would ease the tight money
situation. First National led the way in contacting the other
Boston based institutions. Ken Marty was responsible for fin-
ancing the project at Rause, but as time went by Jim Rouse him-
self started coming up to talk with potential lenders. Even-
tually even the Mayor's office got involved. After many more
months they still could not get enough money together for the
project. Even if they had, Rouse, was then looking at astrono-
mical financing costs. To solve the dilemma he decided to split
the project into three phases, and agreed to accept the Magic
Pan chain into the Quincy Market. With these changes, it still
took six months, but they were able to obtain committments for
the last $3.75 million. Finally, in March of 1975, the deal
came together. The final arrangement was for $21 million in
short term financing at an effective rate of 16 percent. Chase
was chipping in half of that figure; First National just under
15 percent; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance, New England
Mutual Life Insurance, State Street Bank and Trust, New England
Merchants National Bank and Shawmut Bank of Boston together
pitched in 26.33 percent (about 5 1/3 percent each). The remainder
(roughly 9 percent) was put up by the Charlestown Savings Bank,
the Massachusetts Business Development Corporation, the Common-
wealth Bank and Trust Company, the Boston Five Cents Savings
Bank, Union Warren Savings Bank and the South Boston Savings
Bank. Rouse commenced construction without waiting for the loan
closing, because he knew the legal work would take weeks to
complete. Time was running short.
The closing of the permanent financing agreement was a
condition of the temporary take-out. The final arrangement
reached with the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity Association
was as follows: $24.1 million for 30 years at 10.25 percent.
This was subject to completion of the project and a minimum
lease-up guarantee. The loan was broken into three packages -
a commiittment for each phase, but TIAA had legal means of get-
ting out of the latter phases should-the early phases of the
project fall through.
Construction was timely, but costs ran considerably higher
than earlier projections. Some parts of the project needed spe-
cial attention, for instance, most of the windows had to be hand
made and specified. The windows were uneven size, and many had
archways. The utilities and underground access were problematic
too, because the project was built originally on fill. Total
cost of the project was about $30 million, or 50 percent higher
than estimates when Rouse first approached the city back in 1973.
Cost of the Quincy building, the first phase was $7.5 million.
It was completed on time. The G.M.H. Macomber Company did the
construction.
Near completion of the project it was clear that The Rouse
Company's cash investment was going to be much larger than they
preferred, so Rouse approached JMB, a real estate investment
firm for some additional financing. They were amenable to the
idea. The first phase was showing tremendous performance, and
the income projections were sufficient to justify a considerable
investment. The JMB arrangement is an intricate one, but not
uncommon for the type of business they are in. They advanced
$5.2 million, for a position similar to that of a limited partner.
They receive a 10.5 percent preferred return (before Rouse gets
a cent), and because their loan is subordinate to the mortgage,
they get incremented overages determined on the basis of perfor-
mance. Rouse pays debt services on the loan for seven years,
then the agreement is open to consideration of some other options
(details were not disclosed to me).
The Rouse Company does not ordinarily leave any money tied
up in a project, and they are in the process of recovering their
cash outlay now. The tax abatement is the principle method of
iecouping their up-front costs. The project has been generating
sizeable overages, and that is helping to bring Rouse's monitary
investment down. The company estimates that only around 4o00,000
will remain.as unrecovered costs once the tax abatement period
ends. This is pretty good for a $30 million project. (1.33
percent cash investment for virtually 100% of ownership). ICm
of the company's profit will be generated through managing the
property, for which they receive a fee.* The income stream from
operations will be an additional source of revenue to the company,
after debt service is paid. Estimates of income from operations
for 1979 are detailed in the project pro forma below:1 9
cost, plus 5 percent
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Pro Forma Statement of Income
Rouse Company, 1979
Faneuil Hall Market-
place, All buildings,
all sources
Rental Income 6,410,ooo
and Overages 590,000
Total Sources of Revenue
(gross) 7,000,000
Expenses 3,830,000
MJaintenance Management
Repairs, lease and 6 months
tax, payment, vacandies,
etc.
Net Income (Free and Clear)
debt service
Before Tax and Cash Flow
3,170,000
2,570,000
600,000
-.Leasing Activitie.at a he FaneuiHall Marketplace
When The Rouse Company leases space in their shopping malls
the tenants do their own interior renovations, subject to strin-
gent design criteria. At Faneull Hall things were no different.
It placed considerable time constraints on the tenant recruitment
process as a result, however. Leasing was extremely difficult.
Rouse and Thompson wanted to go with small, local vendors, and
insisted on a carefully selected mix of tenants. The theme they
pursued was "a New England flavor at a mix of price ranges," or
as Thompson summed it, "individual proprietorship with immense
chaotic variety."20 They wanted to have the local favorites in
their mall; not just any pizzaria, but Regina's, for example.
In pursuing these objectives a woman familiar with the Boston
area was hired to do extensive searching for prospective tenants.
They stood by their original plans, despite the fact that the
last few slots were extremely difficult to fit. With each delay
in leasing the chances increased that at least some of the in-
terior space would not be completed by opening day. Thirteen of
the original merchants chose to stay at the market. They were
allowed to remain at old rent levels. In return they were to
retain their wholesale trade and not succumb to fast food. For
the most part sufficient variety, was available in the Boston
area to fill out the mix, but the final elements of-the tenant
mix were obtained by convincing local entrepeneurs to open new
kinds-of businesses at the marketplace.
With four months left before opening, 40 percent of the
space in Quincy Market was as yet unleased. At a brainstorming
session at Rouse Company Headquarters, Jim Rouse dreamed up the
idea of how to better integrate the pushcart into the project.
Rouse would build and lease pushcarts to carefully selected
craftspersons to display their wares. Leasing of pushcarts would
be for short periods, like one week minimum, so the cost of entry
would be lower. Within one week a merchant could tell whether
his or her merchandise would sell. Minimizing the risk and
lowering the cost of entry in this way would make the pushcarts
more attractive to artists and to a wider variety of vendors.
The idea was presented at city hall, and it was well received.
They went through with the plan and in retrospect Rouse has said
he believes that the pushcarts are a real drawing card for the
Market area as a whole.
Care was taken in drawing up the leases with the tenants.
Control was the name of the game. Signage requirements were
incredibly stringent, and specifics over the sort of food or
merchandise to be sold by each tenant was written into every
agreement. As it turned out, this became an important safeguard
later on, when merchants sought to add high volume merchandise,
like chocolate chip cookies to their display. Rouse said no.
Firm restrictions were placed on the quality of goods as well.
No touristy nik-naks were permitted, although some of that style
craftswork and higher quality tourist momentos were permitted.
No t-shirts, unframed posters or Faneuil Hall charms were permitted.
Rouse went to great pains to make the marketplace a sophisticated,
quality controlled environment absent of the tinsel and trash
which clutters shopping areas across America. He predicted that
the marketplace would have high tourist appeal and that the
temptation to move toward trinkets would be strong. So to prevent
it, restrictions were clearly specified in the original leases.
Rents at Faneuil were competitive, high, but not outrageous.
In the Quincy building, the 13 original tenants were charged
$3.50 per square foot with ceiling on extra charges and no overage
rent requirement. To meet the pro forma rent level requirement
of $10 per square foot (the amount the- lenders required before
advancement of funds) rent levels of $10-12 per square foot
6o
were proposed to vendors, plus overage rents of 2.5 percent on
sales over a specified minimum. Going rents at the time in
Boston were $6-9 per square foot in the Prudential and other
new office complexes. There was no real comparison to this pro-
ject, however, these rents were really exploratory. More accura-
tely, rents were established according to how much the merchant
could afford to pay. High overhead businesses received lower
rent levels and all new tenants had a provision for overage
rents, based on a percentage of sales.
A good example of this principle is the Ginseng Tea operation.
They expected high sales volume, and had sizable mark-ups on
this product. Their original rent level was $50 per square foot
(they use very little space) plus averages. In '76' -alone they
did so well that they paid Rouse an effective rent of $70 per
square foot, because of overage sales. Overall, however, aver-
age base rent was $12 per square foot, in Quincy Market. 21 -
Rouse bets on the viability and success of the marketplace over
time for his return. He has an overriding concern about quality,
and a long term focus.
The Opening ceremony at the Quincy Market was held 150
years to the day of the original opening under Mayor Quincy in
1826. It was quite a gala affair. The Mayor, Governor and other
dignitaries were in attendance, along with 100,000 Bostonians.
Nearly all the shops were completed, and the bi-centennial ex-
hibit in the great dome of the atrium was a center of attention.
From that day on, sales volumes and total numbers of visitors
shattered all preconceived notions. It was an unquestionable
success. Bostonians loved it. In the first year sales volumes
per square foot ran almost $240 ($60 to $84 per square foot an-
nually is typical for a shopping center). Not including the
Great Dome area, sales were around $270 per square foot, break-
ing all established records. The Quincy Market rose to immediate
national attention, with articles appearing in more than a dozen
national and regional journals. Newspapers proclaimed the econ-
omic and preservationists' success.
Meanwhile, renovations were in full scale for the second
phase of the Market, the South Market Building. The bottom three
floors were planned retail, with clothing, housewares, jewelry
and variety goods in addition to more restaurant and bar space.
The top three floors, one of which was loft space were renovated
for office use. Leasing went much easier than the South- section.
Impressed by the success of the Quincy Building, merchants
flocked to Rouse's leasing agent, seeking space. But again, the
design called for a particular mix and arrangement of stores.'
Rouse went out to find winners. Pro forma rent levels for the
South Market Building were $12 per square foot. There is consider-
able variety among tenants, however. In order to attract Louis
and Ann Taylor (established, high quality clothing stores) who
would not pay rents this high, the Arcade and the Gallery were
created to make'better use of space through subdividing. These
areas featured an interior mall. Rents of $30 per square foot
for street level and $20 per square foot for ground level were
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charged. These shops then, in effect subsidized the magnets
(prestige stores), like Ann Taylor and Louis.
In leasing space, Rouse was drawn to young energetic
entrepreneurs, like the owner of the St. Botalph restaurant (who
now owns and operates Cityside and Seaside restaurants at Faneuil
Hall). He offered these merchants space for their quality wares,
and in many cases assited them in obtaining financing for the
renovations. The Rouse Company personally guaranteed the first
$50,000 in loans for their desired tenants; and sent the merchants
to the lending institutions who were helping with the construc-
tion financing. By opening day, August 26, 1977, the retail area
was nearly 100 percent leased, but it was about 30 percent short
of completion. Several of the stores opened late.
The office and loft space, expected to be a hot item in
underserved Boston, went slowly. Much to Rouse's surprise, Bos-
tonians did not rush to fill up the offices, even though rents
were comparable or lower than the State Street Bank building
(then leasing) next door. On opening day- a substantial portion
of the office space was yet unclaimed.
The second Grand Opening ceremony was another gala event,
and was also well attended. Success of phase II seemed assured.
Sales in the South Building that year, while uncomparably high,
did not reach the record-breaking levels of the Quincy Market.
Second year average sales per square foot ran $278 for the
Quincy building ($320 not including the central dome), and $220
for the South Market Building. The year was glamourous for the
city and for the Rouse Company.
The North Building had been saved for last. There were
more exterior design modifications, and the North Market Street,
which was narrower, was attended to after the South Market Street
arcade was completed. The Thompson design called for a uniform
roof line, and several of the North Market buildings were a floor
taller or a floor shorter than those in the South Building. The
retailing scheme for the North Building focussed on bringing in
some higher priced and higher quality stores, to establish the
market as a serious retail shopping district. There were hopes
of attracting some of the downtown business community away from
other shopping locations, and of appealing to the new residents
of the Waterfront- area. Leasing was easy. Pro forma rent levels
of $14 per square foot were exceeded. Most space was leased at
$15 or more per square foot, with rent going as high as $125
per square foot for the gallery, another mini shop concourse.
These rent levels were high for Boston, but tenants were
still interested. After all, sales volumes were the highest in
the world. The markets' reputation was spreading like wildfire.
By this time more people were visiting Faneuil Hall than Disney
World. The office space again went slowly, but by the third
opening celebration, August 26, 1978, nearly all of the retail
space was ready to open its doors. For the third opening cele-
bration, the Boston Pops played a free outdoor concert at the
marketplace. All the dignitaries attended; each celebration
seemed bigger and better than the previous year's one.
Ben Thompson opened a restaurant at the entrance to the.
North Market. An international and nationally representative
collection of stores had been recruited. Everything from Fiorucci
of New ork to Halley Stewart, a chic sports shop from New Or-
lens, was there. Louis was opening its first store exclusively
devoted to women, and art galleries and other high income shops
were included. Durgin Park had maintained ownership of its
building, in the North row, under agreement to bring it up to the
standards of the rest of the area. They opened a downstairs
oyster bar to supplement their famous upstairs dining hall -
extending a Boston tradition.
The third year of operations at the Marketplace was a con-
tinued success. The sales story is summarized in the table
below. 21
Annual Sales Volumes At Faneuil Hall Market
Ave. Quincy South North
year Overall Market Bldg. Bldg.
1976 $233/Sq. ft. 233
1977 278 278
1978 260 284 220
1979 310 365 300 200
For the Quincy Market not including the Dome space, which Ben
Thompson rents out for banquets and other events, sales were
$320 per square foot for 1978, and $394 per square foot for 1979.
Average rents altogether, after full lease-up, are $12 per square
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foot, plus overage rents. This is on the high end for retail
space, even downtown, but is competitive for the Boston market
for office space. The absence of vacant space at Faneuil Hall
speaks better to how competitive these rents must truly be.
Office and loft space is still leasing, but retail is, a different
story. In the first two years of operation the marketplace lost
no one. During the third year there was a small amount of turn-
over, which allowed several of the pushcart dealers to move into
full fledged stores. The vacancy rate has been less than 3 per-
cent and deliberate holding of space for tenants who are relocat-
iiigis the reason why there has been any.
Operations at the.Marketplace
Overall, the success is remarkable. Over three years nearly
a dozen pushcart dealers have graduated inta full-sized stores.
In conversation, several store owners mentioned to me the spill-
over effect of their Faneuil Hall location. People learn about
their merchandise, and patronize their stores in other locations.
The greatest success story to date is the Chocolate Chip Factory.
Started by a local lawyer, the cookie vendor netted $300,000 in
the first year, off of a pushcart. The owner has quit practicing
law and is going national with his product. Not every store has
such an overwhelming experience; in all, eleven stores have
closed their doors, representing about five percent of all shops.
Pushcart sales are estimated to be $500 a square foot, but rents
are nearly ridiculous, $81 per square foot on an annual basis,22
plus overage rents. At $125 per week, or 10 percent of gross
over $1000, many merchants have had the opportunity to test out
their wares, Overall) turnover in the Bull Market has been
lower than anticipated. A copy of a Bull Market lease agreement
is attached in the appendix.
The retail of the North and South Market Buildings, while
doing very well, at least on an aggregate basis, still lag be-
hind the sales volumes in the food-oriented Quincy building.
In fact, the aggregate numbers hide the actual discrepency be-
tween food and traditional retail, because food-related outlets
in the North and South Market buildings help raise the sales
volume figures. Experience has shown that the shops that have
had the most trouble at the market are the highest priced, most
ppecialized shops. Stores that do substantial amounts of adver-
tising or sale price their merchandise on the other hand,..are
doing quite well. The discrepency in sales volumes has led some
merchants to the conclusion that most visitors to the marketplace
are not serious shoppers, but are instead browsers. To remedy
this situation, Rouse has stepped up promotional activities and
shifted the advertising emphasis from food to clothing and other
retail components of the project. Full page adds appeared in
the Globe and other regional papers emphasizing the more tradi-
tional retail component at Faneuil Hall. Some merchants are still
not totally satisfied with the draw of consumers. But this
should be viewed with a jaundice eye, because most are not anx-
ious to leave, the marketplace either. In a recent Real Paper
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article,23 one North Market shop owner commented that his best
customers come from the airport - -people swho have a several hour
layover, get in a cab and ask the driver what there is to see
in Boston, cabbies drop them off at Faneuil Hall. (That is some
service, I wonder if it can be replicated.)
To determine exactly who the shoppers and visitors to the
market are, Rouse commissioned a market study in late 1978.24
The results of the study were interesting, and added merit to
the retailer's contention that the marketplace was not drawing
the so-called "serious" shopper. While 94.3 percent of the sales
potential is the residential and office worker con-
sumers, fully 41.5 percent of the visitors to the market in 1977
were tourists, as compared to 39.3 percent coming from their
residences from throughout the Boston metropolitan region and
only 2.2 percent office workers coming from work. The sales po-
tential breakdowns for these groups are presented below.
Marketplace Sales Potential By Type Of Customer
Residents Office Tourists
Workers
Sales Potential
(000's) #3,427,608 $133,530 $215,517
Percent 90.8% 3.5% 5.7%
Based on the visitor survey, one of two things is going on; either
the marketplace is immensely more-pgpular as a tourist attraction
than could be expected or the draw, especially from the resident
population is not as strong as it could be. Both hypothesis
probably hold some validity.
Much of the study focused on the responses from the non-
tourist group, because of their sales potential. Of those non-
tourists asked:
18.4 percent asked about the South Building had a negative
response, no knowledge of it, or felt that it was.
too expensive
41.4 percent were unfamiliar with the women's clothing
selection
60.5 percent were unfamiliar with the men's lines
In comparison, only 6.8 percent could not speak about the push-
cart merchandise. The most frequent complaint by patrons was
that things are overpriced:
30.6 percent said so of women's clothing
20.1 percent said so df men's clothing
17.2 percent said so of pushcarts
16.6 percent said so of food
The reason why people go to Faneuil Hall seems primarily for
entertainment. When asked the purpose of their visit:
38.0 percent said curiosity
37.4 percent said tourist, they were siteseeing
31.0 percent said to eat
10.4 percent went for a special purchase
General shopping was not represented among the reasons. A survey
of specific items purchased showed about 40 percent of expendituren
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were for food. Clothing accounted for 13 percent of expenditures,
while novelty items, books and such accounted for about 1.2 per-
cent each. Eighty-seven percent of visitors surveyed had visited
shops or restaurants in the Quincy building, as compared to
46.1 percent who visited the South Market building. (This was
prior to the North Market opening) Average purchase is less
than $6, and most people stay for one and one half to two hours.
There are about 35,000 visitors to the market each day; and
the marketplace is still evolving. The Rouse people recognize
that their best bet for long run economic viability is to corner
the mainstream retail market, especially of those people who
work in the city during the day. Rouse counted on the daytime
traffic through the area to sustain the eating establishments.
They were a little anxious about what their draw would be from
the suburbs, but it has been strong, despite the extreme lack
of parking.
The characteristics of shoppers by point of trip origin are
summarized on the page that follows. Every suburban section of
the Boston metropolitan region, was represented among those sur-
veyed who came from home. Rouse attributes the strength of
this draw to "suburbanite's yearning for a city environment
in which they can feel at ease while enjoying the hustle-bustle
% It25
and variety an urban environment can offer". For whatever
reason, the suburban folks seem to be flocking to the marketplace.
Young people, especially singles, represent a large block of the
consumers at the marketplace; but the most significant portion
SHOPPER CHARACTERISTICS (by point of trip origin)
Shoppers
Coming from Home
63.6 % femaleSex
Shoppers
Coming from Work
48.1% female
Tourists
51.0% female
Median Age
Household Income
(median)
Expenditure (ave.)
Mode of Transportation
Private Auto
Walked
Public Transport
Travel Time (ave.)
Age Distribution
18-24 years
25-34 years
35-44 years45-54 years
55+ years
19.9 %
30.1 %
21.1 %
17.5 %
11.4 %
34 years
$18,330
$6
61.8 %
10.1 %
28.0 %
26 minutes
31 years
$19, 390
$3
28.5 %
51.3 %
18.2 %
8 minutes
38 years
$20, 530
$6
51.7 %
13.8 %
17.0 %
9 minutes
Household Income Distribution
Boston SMSA
186%
18%
33%
31%
less than 10,000
$10,000 to 14,999
$15,00o to 19.999
$20,000 to 24,,999
$25,000 to 49,999
$50,000 and up
13.1%
17.8%
21.3%
20.2%
21.5%
6.1%
is made up of families. The elderly are well represented too.
The median incomes of shoppers are slightly higher than for the
Boston region as a whole, but the range of incomes of shoppers
is quite representative. (see tables)
Overall, the market seems to have a tremendous potential.
The people visiting the marketplace are certainly customer candi-
dates. Perhaps the merchants are right - too much emphasis has
been placed on the markets as a festival, a fun place to go rat-
her than a serious place to shop. Still, the sales volumes at
Faneuil Hall are far from small. Despite the complaining, most
of the merchants are still making out like bandits, they just
want to see the full potential tapped. So does Rouse.
The conflicting interests7 of the food and other re-
tailers have spilled over into the operations of the project
as well. Operations, much to the surprise of some observers have
presented many challenges to management. Aside from the conflicts
mentioned above over who was to sell what, retailers object to
food being dragged in their doors. And then there is the issue
about how to allocate maintenance costs. Maintenance costs are
shared by the tenants, and allocated on a pro-rated basis deter-
mined by square footage, type of service, and other considerations.
Non-food merchandisers feel that the bulk of trash is created by
the food vendors, and that they also benefit more from the common
space. The tenants share the costs of maintaining the common
area. Adjustment in the percentage charges for maintenance were
necessary in order to satisfy some of the retail tenants.
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Under the tax/lease arrangement with the city, Rouse is to
take full responsibility for sewer, garbage collection, main-
tenance and security. With the hug-e volume of traffic through
the area, and the high component of food sales, these costs have
been much higher than earlier estimated. Compounding the pro-
blem is the fact that because of the cobblestone streets, snow
and garbage removal must be done by hand, at considerable cost.
A tunnel was constructed below the Quincy Market for utilities
and to provide service access for the shops in the complex./
Because the markets were originally built on fill, the tide has
to be pumped from the tunnel twice a day. While some of these
expenses were included in the estimates, the cost of maintenance
at Fanueil Hall far surpasses that of conventional shopping
centers. And, Rouse takes a firm stand on the quality of upkeep
and security at the marketplace. His maintenance people pick up
round the clock, and the security is ample. He puts a lot of
emphasis on the quality of the environment. Some of the tenants
feel that his emphasis is over-exuberant, and at their expense.
So, in January of 1979 a group of tenants approached Rouse about
what they could do to bring down a maintenance costs. An arrange-
ment was reached whereby a group of the food merchants now extend
an extra effort to encourage patrons to use waste facilities, and
the merchants each do maintenance in their immediate areas.
Another issue to be resolved was how to deal with the street
musician and entertaining groups. It was an advantage to have
them around -- they entertain customers. On the other hand, they
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remaining at very low rents ($5 0 per square foot) because their
volume can not sustain more. At the other end of the scale,
rents have been renegotiated as high as $160 per square foot to
date, and are expected to go much higher. (Individual rights
of the tenants prevent disclosure of negotiated rent levels.)
At this rate,.returns will be substantial in the future.
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Caution
SUMARY EVALUATION OF THE FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE PROJECT
ACTOR EVALUATION
Ben Thompson
- committed to the idea of
a downtown mall, wanted
to see it completed
- wanted to save the historic
monument, and had very
strong ideas about how best
to preserve its quality
He is thrilled with the
outcome. His plan was
used, he got his way about
how the preservation was
handled; and the project
is a tremendous success
generating lots of additional
business for him.
The Rouse Company
- wanted to make a profit'
- wanted to do a project in
a central city to prove it
could be done, and could be
profitable
- sought to avoid the problems
the project had suffered
before Rouse's involvement
- wanted to develop a uniquely
Bostonian environment that
would be a social as well as
an economic and aesthetic
success.
Rouse is very happy with
the outcome. The economics
of the project far exceed
expectations, they are making
a healthy profit for their
effort. They also proved all
the things they set out to
prove, the city was the place,
financing was possible to
attain, unconventional design
plans can work well. The
project is well aclaimed,
bringing lots of good publicity
to Rouse, and satisfaction to
those who helped put it together.
City of Boston (Boston Redevelopment Authority)
- wanted to preserve the
historic buildings
- wanted to curb their blight-
ing influence, create a
pleasant linkage between
downtown aid the waterfront
- increase Itax'base
The buildings are beautifully
restored, active, tax producing,
and economically revitalizing
adjacent areas. They have con-
tributed to the overall improve-
ment of the area, catalyzing
much private sector reinvest-
ment, creating additional tax
revenues and jobs in the city.
- provide jobs and stimulus for
the downtown economy
- to bring some private invest-
ment dollars back downtown
The project is a tourist
attraction, brings in out-
siders dollars, and is a
statns symbol for the city as
a whole and a feather in the
Mayor's cap.
Lending Community
- wanted to fulfill social re-
sponsibilities
- wanted to see Boston revita-.
lized
- hoped to get their money
back
The project was succesful, the
loan was repaid. The bankers
got some public relations
mileage out of participating
in the consortium and were
saved the embarassment of
having turned down such a suc-
cessful project.
Marketplace Merchants
- wanted to make a profit, to
be part of an exciting new
project
- many wanted to further pene-
trate the local market and
saw the project as a way of
gaining exposure, growing.
North End Residents
- wanted to see end of blighting
influence
- wanted increased open space
- wanted to realize profit from
increasing land values
- hoped to capitalize on tourist
industry
- wanted to avoid social problems,
increasing housing costs, specu-
lation, destruction of social
fabric and ethnic flavor, traf-
fic and parking problems
Most of the merchants are
making terrific profits, sales
are strong, prices high, rents
and extras are high but not
intolerable. Many stores re-
port spill-over effects for
stores in other locations.
Some criticism from highest
priced merchants.
The feelings are mixed. While
business has never been better
in the North End, and the value
of land in the area has sky-
rocketed; housing prices are
rising, as are social problems
and the area's ethnic flavor is
slowly eroding. Traffic and
parking problems are severe,
noise and open space concerns
have received some but inade-
quate attention. Much more
needs to be done to assure that
the residents can remain happy
in the area.
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Other Bostonians with an Economic
- other retailers hoped it would
not steal their market, this
was important to Washington St.
merchants, Boylston St., New-
bury St. and Harvard Square
merchants as well as haymarket
- small craftspersons who would
like a chance to enter the mar-.
ket (bull market pushcarts
were for them)
- contractors hoped to see stimu-
lus in rehabilitation activities
- land owners hoped for apprecia-
tion in the area
Interest in the Outcome
Washington Street has seen
an increase in business, more
shoppers coming downtown.
Newbury and Harvard Square
have different clientele, have
seen no decline, Boylston is
slightly hurt.
The pushcarts have been an
important entrepreneurial
stepping stone for many Bos-
tonians.
Building permits are way up.
Restoration and rehabilitatio_
of commercial and residential
is very prevalent. Land values
have escalated beyond imagina-
tion.
An evaluation of a shopping center's success should begin
with the customers and the tenants. Customers show favor or dis-
favor with their frequency of attendence and expenditures of
dollars. At Faneuil Hall, attendence is phenorenal. Dollar sales
are still the highest in the world; people seem to love it. As
the market weeds out those shops for which there is insufficient
demand we can see how well Rouse captured the New Englander's eye.
Only eleven shops (less than five percent) have closed their doors.
There have literally been no vacancies since opening. Rent levels
are what most developers would consider incredible. I interviewed,
by phone, a mixture of tenants, for three reasons: to get a
sense of the success on a micro level, to determine the level 6f
optimism about the project, and to uncover attitudes about Rouse
Company management and operations. Some of these results are
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arrayed belowr:
EVALUATTON OF SALES AND SALES
POTENTTAL AT THE FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE
GENERAL COMMENTS
FOOD VENDORS
R eginas
(pizza
things have gone very well since
outset no complaints whatsoever
Swenson's
(ice cream)
Coffee Connec-
tion
Brown Derby
Deli
Magic Pan
Crickets
A this is one of their best outlets,
sales grow 40 to 50 percent each year
A sales are excellent, no major com-
plaints whatsoever
A sales slow considerably during win-
ter. This year they are down about
five percent off last year but things
are still very good. They expect
a strongyear, no complaints about
Rouse
B they are very fond of Rouse opera-
tions, expected a tremendous suc-
cess. They are very pleased with
the outcome
A the market's draw is phenominal.
very satisfied, no major concerns
OTHERITEMS
Ann Taylor 3
(women's cloth)
C they get a lot of traffic, but volume
is a little slow. Sales go over well
but would like to see a little more
general spending
Papagallo 1
(shoes)
Goods 3
(clothing and
trinkets)
Louis 3
(men's and wo-
men's cloth)
The Sandpiper 1
(children's
clothing)
Crate and Barrel 1
(household
wares)
Gepetto's Toys
B sales are very good, lots of traf-
fic very pleased with this loca-
tion and with the marketplace as
a whole
D the marketplace is not that encour-
aging. They feel it is a civic
focal point and people go to be en-
tertained. No serious shopping,
impulse shopping is strong but they
don't sell their main stock items,
Think Rouse is terrific.
G) a little disappointed with volume,
however the market is beginning to
develop. They say the marketplace
is neither dynamic nor disappointing,
fine product but people are slow to
begin real buying.
A very pleased with sales, year-round
strength in volume, few fluxuations,
see steady increases in buying
throughout the marketplace, no com-
plaints. Also seeing spillover to
Chestnut Hill store.
B continuously exceed projections.
Very satisfied with Marketplace lo-
cation. Seeing spread effect to
other stores around Boston area,
overall quite pleased.
A The market is exactly as they ex-
pected, terrific. They went from
pushcart to full store, no problems
with Rouse.
key:
Evaluation:
1. exceeds expectations
2. meets expectations
3. disappointment
Strength:
A. exceptional
B. good
C. fair
D. weak or spotty
4/
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Most merchants feel that the market has considerable Poten-
tial. Food merchants are still outpacing other stores, and are
probably the cause of high expectations. Overall, the merchants
seem pleased with Rouse as a landlord. Two shops explained the
new retail advertising scheme to illustrate how Rouse takes care
of the tenants. Optimism toward the future is high and justifi-
ably so, sales continue to grow. The children's stores are doing
very well, this is because of the family draw. People in the
age groups, 25 to 40, seem to be focussing on the restaurant
side. The basic point shopowners had was that attention must be
paid to marketing the area as a shopping district, not as a car-
nival.
The Rouse Company has reason to be delighted. The project
is an overwhelming success from a developer's standpoint. They
are very attentive to day to day operations and are constantly
seeking to improve the project, but the basic feeling is deep
satisfaction. The marketplace is an acclaimed success. And the
project is a real breadwinner for Rouse. With about $400,000 of
equity in the project, Rouse expects to see about $250,000 in
revenues after expenses and debt service (before taxes) annually,
or a 62.5 percent return. This is on average, and is income
from operations only. Rouse also receives a fee for providing
management and maintenance. And the project has done more for
the Rouse Company's reputation than any other.
The fee for managing the property, covers all staff time re-
quired to operate the project (with the exception of public
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relations time spent talking about it. The primary source of in-
come from the property is overage rents, based on a percentage
of sales. Thus Rouse is enjoying the benefits of developing
a profitable product.
The Rouse Company had reason to believe the scheme would
work: their best projects in the past relied heavily on small
specialty shops and outstanding designs. But the marketplace
exceeds their wildest hopes for a civic amenity. When asked to
speak about Rouse projects, company representatives find that
the questions return. ta Faneuil Hall over and over. The market-
place intrigues the public, planners, and politicians alike.
In a speech before the Land Institute this year in Detroit,
Jim Rouse set forth what he considers to be the keys to success
for this sort of project. 2
- Location. A building, no matter how magnificent
is a bad risk if it is surrounded by urban desolation.
- The City. The city must be ready to cooperate, to
take risks.
- Financing. Urban markets will have few AAA tenants.
Without them a builder has to sell a lender on his
resources.
- The architect. The architect must understand old
buildings and retailing.
With Faneuil. Hall these pieces fell into place. When asked about
the project, he said he was convinced that a central city market-
place - in the right location and in the right city - would suc-
ceed, if it was developed, owned, managed, promoted, and mer-
chandised by a single operator. He said he took on the risk at
Faneuil Hall knowing that "if it failed it would give a black
eye to the possibilities of the inner city". But he believed and
hoped that "if it succeeded, it would send a message across the
country."2 From this standpoint the project has been overwhelm-
ingly successful. Nationwide there is a movement to replicate
Faneuil Hall Marketplaces.
When asked about the shortcomings of this project the ans-
wer is anonymous - the delays. Financing, leasing and tax ne-
gotiations were agonizing and threatened the feasibility of the
project. A near two year delay increased the cost of dcing
the project by about 30 percent, (perhaps as much as 50 percent
on account of the phasing), not to mention Rouse and Thompson's
carrging costs. While they succeeded in building the product
they dreamed of, the delays were very frustrating. Both Rouse
and Thompson are sensitive to the risk that the City of Boston
was undertaking. They appreciate the gravity, from the city's
point of view, of leasing the property for 99 years. But they
both hope that the project forms a strong precident, easing the
way for future architect/developer teams in negotiations with
this and other cities.
Ben Thompson had a visionary set of expectations for the
marketplace. He was convinced it would be successful, he looked
for something more. On the meaning of the marketplace Thompson
said, "of all the pieces in the urban puzzle, the marketplace is
the most fundamental, most civically important - and most neglected
in America. It is a potent model of the planned and unplanned
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vitality that all public places and city streets must attain in
the humanized city of the future. In becoming the city market-
basket once again, Faneuil Hall Marketplace has the chance of
regaining that genuine character of a city center." Thompson
was seeking this quality in developing his designs and in deter-
mining materials. Now that his plan has been carried out,*he feels
that its success comes close to attaining his original dreams.
When asked why it is so successful, Thompson explained, "People
need the variety and abundance that markets bring. Socially,
they need the communal security of personal contact and mutual
exchange. Psychologically, they hunger for the festive activity
and action that markets add to the central city. The natural
pageantry of crowds and goods, of meat, fish and crops, of things
made and things grown, all to be smelled, tasted, seen and touched,
are the prime source of sensations and amusement in whole popula-
tions - in many nations except our own. The Faneuil Hall Parket
area is such a place geographically, and comes close to working
that way economically, socially, and functionally." 4
Critics had much to say about the marketplace. Diane White
of theGRobe wrote that the markets were not "real", that they
were sanitized, middle-class tourist',s version of markets without
smells or mess - a theatrical representation of city life, pre-
sented for visitors who might feel incommoded by the real thing.5
The architectural. critic of theGlob% Robert Campbell said Ms.
White misses the point - that all great cities have always been
half theater. That's why we like them. He says, "it was when
people stopped 'attending' Boston that its trouble began."6
He feels the marketplace is a tremendous rendition, to be cele-
brated and applauded. Ben Thompson was awarded an Architectural
Award for his design of the marketplace. This award, and all
his requests for versions to suit dozens of towns across America
are not his feather for his cap. To me that came from the Arch-
tectural Critic of the San Francisco Chronicle, Allan Temko. He
wrote, "After holding the national championship in historic pre-
servation since the 1960s, when Ghirardelli Square and the Cannery
inaugurated a new era in city-saving, San Francisco has lost the
crown to Boston." 7 When the parQchial San Francisco new.spapers
hand over the praise, one can be assured there'is no question,
you have designed the finest product. Ben Thompson is satisfied.
John Sayers, BRA project director for the Waterfront/Faneuil
Hall renewal called the marketplace "a dramatic success in terms
of economic viability, which was the biggest concern of the city." 8
He went on to say, "we are completely satisfied, especially in
light of the early frustrations; and feel fortunate to have the
Rouse Company as developers." Sayers outlines the city's objec-
tives in the project as threefoldi 1) retain and restore the
structures to a viable use, 2) develop a complex that was an
asset to the city, viable economically and tax producing, 3) de-
velop a use which is compatible and complimentary to other pro-
jects in the area, and which attracts tourists. With regards to
these objectives, the marketplace is a perfect use. When the BRA
evaluates a project, they apparently check to see that the
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objectives have been met, that problems have been mitigated or
avoided, and then look for extra benefits. Sayers points out
that the Rouse company is a joy to work with. The BRA had no
problems with the company stretching uses to the limits of the
guidelines, no problems with them living up to their committ-
ments, and nd problem with the developer going overboard to make
a profit, none of which are unusual for Urban Renewal projects.
He attributes the success to great planning, a receptive city
government and an effective BRA. He feels the city involvement
was very important, that the city did everything within reason
to help get it developed. He points out they were anxious to do
all that they could. On the other hand, he notes, the city got
off very cheaply. Most of the money came from Federal sources.
The utilities and other expenses would have been undertaken re-
gardless, and the Rouse Company bore some of these costs. He
feels that the tax agreement is very beneficial to the city,
at 25 percent of revenue, slightly above the going rate of 23
percent. Still, the city would like to realize some of the re-
venue that the state is getting. (More detail about the fiscal
impact is provided in the next section.)
When asked what he would have done differently given the
advantage of hindsight,Sayers said very little. He said they
needed Rouse, with his financial strength and marketing abilities.
To get them they had to free the reigns quite a bit. He feels
Roger Webb and Architectural Heritage would not have been able
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to do as much, even with BRA support. Sayers told me the bulk
of criticism about the Urban Renewal project has to do with lack
of public access to the Waterfront, or permitting tall towers
along the water, which cut off many downtown harbor views.
People are- not critical of the Marketplace part of it. At the
time when the plan was conceived, the area was in dire need of
reinvestment, different concerns guided the planners. The con-
cept of the marketplace, however, turned out to be exactly the
right thing, before and after the project was completed.
With respect to the attitude of the North End residents
toward the project Sayers replied, "the changes in the North End
would have occurred with or without the project - the project
just catalyzed it." 9
The North End Planner, Bill Mirada agrees, "the trend back
to the city on the part of upper income young people has been
experienced throughout the city. It is becoming chic to live in
ethnic neighborhoods, and the North End, although better isolated
and protected than most, was bound to see, trouble sooner or later.
Some speculation occurred, but it has been pretty well control-
led."10 Both feel that the changes were predictable, and that
actions were taken to assist the area. This contention is ex-
amined in the next section. Efforts to mitigate the market pres-
sures through public subsidies have been opposed in the North
End, traditionally, the BRA worked with the community to help
change their minds. But the community opposed the subsidized and
elderly housing proposed by the Urban Renewal Plan, and a
89
considerable struggle ensued. to get it built. At the same time,
the community blames the Waterfront development for the re-
cently experienced- housing pressures in their ndighborhood, and
resent the imposition of a different class of residents in their
neighborhood. Feelings about Faneuil Hall are somewhat different.
It is not considered the main protagonist, the residential com-
ponent of the Waterfront project is. Faneuil Hall is an amenity
for neighborhood residents, and they appreciate the business
that it generates for local retail and restaurant owners. Their
major complaints about Faneuil Hall are the traffic and parking
problems it generates. These, too are discussed in the impact
assessment section which follows.
Politically, the project has been a real plus for the mayor.
He takes credit for its success, and enjoys considerable publicity
because of it. His office overlooks the site, so he can enjoy
its aesthetics better than most. Mayor White's pleasure with
the outcome is best revealed in the pride with which he talks
about it.
Perhaps the toughest evaluation is obtained through a canvass
of the lending community. The Boston lenders are well known to
be very conservative. It is interesting to learn how their views
have been changed by the project. At outset none would partici-
pate willingly. All believed the loan was much too risky. Even
once the consortium was committed to the construction loan, many
of the participants had their doubts. I asked the consortium
participants four questions about the lo.an: 1) Why did you bank
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initially agree to participate? 2) Given similar circumstances
(i.e. loan characteristics) would you write a similar loan
today? 2A) for those lenders who write permannent financing,
(insurance companies and very large banks), I asked if they would
be willing to buy a piece of the Faneuil Hall mortgage if Teacher's
Insurance and Annuity wanted to reduce their share. 3) Has the
success of the Faneuil Hall project changed your bank's atti-
tude toward the risk of projects of this sort? 4) Any general
comments about the loan or the development project itself? The
results are recorded in the exhibit which follows.
The bankers' views vary considerably. They range from feeling
sure that the project will collapse tomorrow to feeling it is the
greatest thing to ever come along, (one bank has funded several
others since), All agreed that the risk was very high at the
time the loan was written. Half of the lenders reported feeling
they would be repaid, but because of the financial strength of
the Rouse Company, not because the project had anyhope of success.
One banker indicated all that matter to him was the permanent
committment.1 2 He was satisified that Rouse would meet the re-
quirements to take out the permanent loan, so he felt his bank's
loan was protected.
Fully half of the lenders wrote the loan for strictly public
spirited reasons. Either they did not trust the city to uphold
its agreement, or they thought the project was crazy, or the loan
was too high at too high a rate. For whatever reason, they-felt
the chance of being repaid was small. One lender reported they
LENDING
INSTITUTION
Why did you
write the loan
initially?
Would you
write the loan
today?
Changes in
perceived
risk? GENERAL COMMENT2
New England felt community Without very much They generally do not write
Mutual Life pressure, also hesitations they have short term loans, but here
Insurance Co. felt assured of funded First National played a key
S. Anthony, repayment, loan three role. They have participated
V.P. was too big, if since in joint ventures before and
shared, the risk (smaller - feel it is a good way to
was not so great $2.5 mil.) spread risk.
New England questioned feas- They would no change Only Rouse could have pulled
Merchants ibility, but had not do it This project it off. The rent projections
National faith in Rouse Co. out of is too were unbelievable, they had
Bank guarantee & fin- town, and unique, will too little leased. Their
B. Swain, ancial strength would prob- never be record of success and collat-
Sr. V.P, Also- frequently ably only do replicated eral in the form of otherparticipate in it if Rouse projects made the difference.
consortiuis was head.
John Hancock
Mutual Life
Insurance Co.
Mr. Ernst,
V.P.
Boston V'
Savings
Bank
Paul Coveney
had participated
in consortiums
before, took a
lot of pressure
(from Mayor, he
says) because
they thought it
was too risky.
public spirited
loan, funded be-
cause of public
pressure. The
loan made no
business sense.
Would depend
on circum-
stances,
perhaps
unlikely
some change,
tempered by
circumstances,
still wary of
these projects
very little
still feel
the project
is much too
risky.
Hancock was asked to do the
permanent financing and
refused, too risky. They
also noted Chase bought other
participants off early once
success was evident (interst
was high).
They do not do much real
estate. This project was
too big, too expensive, bad
tenants, wanted too high
percentage. First National
deserves, credit for the loan.
LENDING
INSTITUTION
Wby did you
write the loan
initially?
Would you
write the loan
today?
Changes in
perceived
risk? GENERAL COMMENTS
State Street often involved absolutely strengthened The best thing about this
Bank and in consortium, their good application was Rouse, he
Trust Co. felt Rouse could feelings about had a strong record, good
Mr. Aller, pull it off, that renewal pro- financial position.
V.P. the loan was safe, jects, hadhowever the timing seen mixed
was bad, money results in
was tight in a74. the past.
Charlestown saw as strictly doubtful, it they are am- They never write a loan
Savings Bank community contri- depends on azed at the with any risk at all.
P. Damon, bution, felt sure the project. success, im- They did not trust the
V..money would be Rouse adds. pressed with city to come through, andlong gones a great deal. Boston shoppers questioned retail plan.
Shawrnut Bank h-ad misgivings but yes Success can't Their real question was
of Boston, N.A. felt reasonably help but im- the rent levels - higher
R. Williams, assured of repay- prove their than they had seen or
V*pa ment. Trusted outlook. could believe. The key
Rouse. was a reliable permanent
committment.
Commonwealth Thought the project yes some improve- Rouse was the key to the
Bank & Trust was an exciting ment in their proposition, and to the
Company concept for downtown outlook, they success They were happy
Boston, located next do more rehab to participate because itSm Ken door to their bank, now, but smaller was a local project.
First National did scale.
a strong selling job.
LENDING
INSTITUTION
Why did you
write the loan
initially?
Would you
write the loan
today?
Changes in
perceived
risk? GENERAL COPMENTS
TTnion Warren thought it was absolutely probably. A lot of the leasing was
Savings Bank a good thing They expected done prior to construction,
Mr. 3witten for the city, a moderate The builder was reliableand felt it was success and and Rouse had done his
basically a are impressed homework. Execution of the
good loan, by the outcome, project was beautifUly
handled.
South Boston
Savings Bank
P. Archibald
they thought it
was a sure loser,
wrote the loan
as a committment
to the city of
Boston.
yes, provided
that the area
was being re-
vitilized, the
developer was
right, and they
were not the
lead bank, but
only a partici-
pant.
no change.
they view the
project as
unique, and
don't usually
get involved
with this sort
because they
haven't the
staff to analyze
it.
Peter Blampied of 5# Savings
got them involved.. He is
a friend, and convinced them
it was a good thing for
Boston, they were the last
contribution.
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had very limited funds, and this simply was not their preferred
project.1 3 For skeptical lenders these loans were justified to
their boards as a committment to the city of Boston; support of
the downtown area, where a number of their other holdings were;
a response to the pressure and criticism coming from the Mayor
and the Boston Globe; or for other civically minded reasons.
Consistent with this, half the lenders said they would
write the loan again. Of those who would not, three said they
would if Rouse were the developer, two said they would not under
any circumstances. Eight of ten lenders said their attitude
about this sort of loan had improved. At the same time five said
they felt the Faneuil Hall Miarketplace is too unique to be com-
pared.
In retrospect, the loan could not have been obtained had it
not been for the following factors: 1. First National's leader-
ship in setting up the consortium, 2. Rouse's success record as
a developer and their financial strength in the form of income-
producing properties in other locations, 3. local pressure to
participate in the loan coming from the Boston Globe and perhaps
from the Mayor himself. Setting it up again would be al little,
but not too much easier. But if achievement of change in the
attitudes of this opinionated, immobile lending community can
be considered-a success then the marketplace has been somewhat
successful in this way as well. I- consider this "bottom-line"
evidence of the marketplace's contribution to Boston.
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The Faneuil Hall Marketplace has had many beneficial
impacts on the city of Boston. The major negative impacts
of the project are the changes it has helped to induce
in the North End residential community. At least some of the
residents of that area see these changes as destructive to
their way.of life. Whether these changes are viewed as
good or bad obviously depends on oneis perspective. The
purpose of this section is to illuminate the impacts the
project creates, especially with respect to the North End,
and to discuss their ramifications.
The major impacta-on the North End are as follows:
1. Housing - The supply and demand characteristics of
residential units in the area are changing. Market
pressures result in higher rents, unit upgrading and
condominium conversion. Wohile stock in the North End
has been slow to turn over, luxury housing construction
and rehabilitation activities on the Waterfront make
this area increasingly attractive to high income
residents and change in ownershtD is very likely to
occur, if it is not already occurring.
2. Traffic and Parking - These traditional problems have
become worse due to increase in visitors to the area
and the lack of new parking facility construction on
the part of the city.
3. Commercial Activity - New commercial areas change the
nature of the area. Business is increasing, the value
of commercial space is increasing rapidly. Local Mom &
Pop stores may not be able to compete, and some
commercial displacement might occure. As the value
of commercial space in the area increases, it might
limit the opportunities for existing residents to get
a start due to high entry costs.
4. Social Environment - New residents and visitors intro-
dface changes in the activities which go on in the area.
Ethnic and other demographic differences exist between
the incoming and existing residents. For a longer
period, families have been moving to the suburbs to
raise the chilaren, and the existing population has been
aging. The immigrant population is not replenishing the
native Italian stock at the same rate. The newcomers
are predominately young (20 - 3L years of age), childless
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.couples or single persons, upwardly mobile, white collar
and with different interests and lifestyles than the
traditional area residents.
The marketplace and waterfront renewal activities enhanced
the North End residential community as well. There are new
public facilities, more parks and recreational facilities, and
oublic works have been upgraded. The city has provided some
homeownership and rehabilitation assistance to help counter
the market pressures, and subsidized housing, especially for
the elderly, has been substancially increased. The economy o
the neighborhood is much healthier, the tourist trade is grow-
ing, and many of the troublesome sections of the neighborhood
are receiving increased attention. Streets have been repaired,
landscaping provided, and some of the jobs at the Marketplace
are going to North End residents.
But some North Enders feel that these improvements are
targeted for the incoming residents, and that displacement of
existing residents is occurring, and will increase in the future.
The intent of this section is to explore some of the costs and
benefits of the Faneuil Hall Marketplace project, and the-mag-
nitude of impact it has had on the city of Boston. The section
is split into qix sections: fiscal, economic, and land value
impacts; traffic and parking; social. and other impacts; and
displacement in the North End is discussed in a final section.
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Fiscal Impact
At the time that the:BRA acquired the North and South
Market buildings, they were generating around $130,000 in
tax revenues annually. The Quincy building was tax exempt,
as it was already owned by the ity. Many options were available
to the city at that time regarding ownership, leasing, use,
disposition and public investment in the area. Were the
buildings left in their existing andition, the same assess-
ment at today's tax rate would be generating roughly $300,000
in taxes annually. 2 Including the Quincy building the total
rises to $516,252. This would be the City's incomel froM the
properties today had they leased it to a developer in 1969.
A summary of these calculations is provided on the next page.
Instead, the city decided to use HUD historic preser-
vation grants to undertake exterior restorations in hope of
enticing a developer to make major improvements to the area,
substnatially increasing its tax producing potential.
Once the final disposition was determined, considerably
more public investment was undertaken. Many of these im-
provements were to be put in regardless of what was to happen,
but it made sense to wait until a development plan was approved
so that the investment would precisely fit the new developer's
needs. In all, $11.15 million in public resources were in-
vested in the properties. Of the $11.15 million, the cit-y
share was $2.38 million, or 21 percent. The Federal govern-
ment, in the form of Urban Renewal funds and special project
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Real Estate Taxes on Faneuil Hall Markets-with no Improvements
Comparison, 1968, 1979
North Market Building
Land
Building'units
Total Assessment
$ 334,100.
245,'900.
560,000.
Total tax income to City, 1968
Total tax income to City, 1979
1968
TAX RATE
$117.80
per $1000
$68,324.
1979
TAX RATE
$270.00
per $1000
$156,600.
South Market Building
Land
Building units
Total Assessment
$ 247,800.
9a200.
07,000.
Total tax income to City, 1968
Total tax income to City, 1979
total - both buildings
less - Durgin Park
Total Estimated Tax Income
Quincy Market Building
Land
Building
Total Assessment
Maximum Tax Income
$ 486,000.
114,000.
d00,000.
$71,504.
$139,838.
8,828.
$131,010.
Tax Exempt
$131,010.
$163,90.
$320,490.
20,234.
$300,256.
$216,000.
$516,256.
Source: Faneuil Hall Marketplace: The differ tial
State Tax Yield. BRA, September, 1978
analysis based on assessor's records.
in City and
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grants provided the other $8.77 million. The total cost of
the project was $40 million, including these public sources,
so the total government share was just above 25%.. The allo-
cations and sources of funding are summarized below.
Source of Funds: Faneuil Hall Marketplace 3
Total Public
1/3 city
1/3 federal
Investment $11 million
Utilities
Land
1.1 million
acquisition 3.0
Parking lot 2
Paving
materials .35
Exterior
restoration
of North and
South Bldgs. 2.5
City share
$2.38 million
(21.3%)
Federal share.
$4.77 million
(42. 8 f)
7.15
Quincy
Market res-
0.6
toration
H.U.D. Historical Preservation
grant
Dock Square 2.2
Park, Fed-
eral Urban Systems grant
Relocation 1.2
Federal share
$4.0 million
(35.9%)
4.0
Total $11.15 million
The tax/lease agreement4 provided that Rouse bear all
maintenance upkeep and service costs. A share of revenue
from the project would be paid to the city as a payment in
leiu of taxes.
The agreement called for 20 percent of gross income to
be paid in leiu of taxes and lease payments, the percentage
Federal
sources
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increasing as did revenues, never exceeding 25 percent
of gross. The going rate (in the city of Boston) for office
and retail establishments is about 23 percent of rental
income.5 Assessments of commercial property in Boston are
determined by a capitalized value of the income stream. The
tax rate.on commercial properties results in a tax payment
of roughly 23 percent of annual income. The 121A agreements
are based directly on income off the property. While the city
could have asked for more in payment, because it was granting
lease rights too, the project had very high financing costs,
and a higher payment provision might have killed the proposal.
At the time of the signing, Stuart Forbes, the city's financial
advisor, suggested that the project would generate $1.5 mil-
lion annually by the mid-1980's. 6 To the city officials
this looked quite sufficient.
The first three years of operation Rouse paid a total of
$650,000, as arranged in the original agreement. At $1.5
million annually the city will recover lost revenues quickly.
And the service costs to the city on the project are minimal,
since Rouse pays all maintenance and services. These tax
dollars are nearly net revenue for the city. In light of
this fact the payments are generous indeed. The Rouse figures
for next year's tax payment are as follow: 7
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Tax Formula: 25 percent of Adjusted Gross Income
Gross Revenues 8 $7,000,000
less 1/3 for adjust. 2,333,333
Adjusted Gross Revenue $4,667,000
x tax rate .25
TAX PAYMENT tl.166,725
Seven million is their estimated gross revenue, including
$590,000 in overage rents. Roughly 2/3 will be taxable.
An adjustment is taken to account for flows which are taken
in as revenue, but actually represent pass-through charges.
Expenses which fall in this category include: Maintenance,
Fire Insurance, Common area charges, Electricity, Promotional
budget, General Administrative costs, Heat& Ventilation,
Maintenance of heat and vent equipment, and Management.
The city's estimates are slightly higher, but in the same
ballpark. A copy of their estimates is included in the appen-
dix. Over the next five years tax payments should average
least $1,225,000 per year. With these projected revenues
the differential return on public investment is 38.9 percent
on the city's money, and 8.2 percent on total public expen-
ditures.
Differential Return on Public Investment
project what would have
225,000 00,000 taxes been paid = 38.9%
2,930.,000 city investment
1,225 000 - 300,000 - 8.2 percent on Federal and11,150,00 Local Dollars
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The value created in the buildings, based on a capped income
stream analysis, is $26,416,667. As compared to the 1968
valuation of $1.98 million, this represents an increase of
$24,430,000 in the assessed value of downtown Boston.9
Indirectly the project has had a considerable effect on
tax revenues for the downtown area. While nearby residential
areas have not been re-assessed, for political and legal
reasons, (to be discussed later) most of the adjacent commer-
cial and office properties have. Henry Penta, the downtown
area property tax assessor says revenues are up "considerablr"
He could not give more details.10 The marketplace has stimu-
lated a lot of investment in renovations throughout the area,
and the overall rejuvenation will do a great deal for the
city's tax rolls.
The last issue to be considered is whether the city could
have generated any more revenue through an alternative land
use, in other words, what was the city's opportunity cost?
The general feeling is that office space geherates more taxes
than retail ($2.40 per square foot as opposed to $l.LO per
square foot on average ) but this is based on the assimjnp-
tion that rent levels for office space will be higher. At
Faneuil Hall Market taxes will be about $3.20 a square foot. 1 2
More revenue is generated from the retail parts than the office
space. Had a larger proportion of the project been office
space, tax payments would not have been higher. Using BRA
1Tfigures 
-, assming all office use in North and South Buildi'zs
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with canmercial in Quincy, estimated tax payments are as
follows:
310,000 sq.ft. x $2.40 = $744,000
75,000 sq.ft. x $1.40 = $105,000
$8LI9,000
This ccmpares less favorably than the present arrangement.
Hotel use was the other option considered. It is doubt-
ful the revenues from hotel use could have been Breater than
those generated by the existing project!4 Assuming North and
South buildings converted to hotel rooms at 500 sq. ft. per
room, 620 rooms would be available. Assuming a 70%o occupancy
rate at $40 per night, $6,319,040 in annual revenues would be
generated. The BRA suggests a tax rate of 8% on all sources
of income, yielding a $505,523 tax payment. With the Quincy
again as retail space, $105,000 would be added for a total
tax payment of $610,523 annually.
Comparing figures, it is clear that the city did very
well by way of taxes. Takes from the project itself could
hardly be greater. Moreover, the stimulus to the area that
the Rouse project created will aid the tax rolls even more.
A summary of tax payments under alternate cases is provided
below.
Comparison of Tax Revenues Under Alternate Uses
FHM Office Hotel Previous Use
Annual Tax
Payments $1,225,000 $849,000 $610,523 $300,000
Economic Impact
The Marketplace has had a positive impact on the local
economy in terms of job provision, entrepreneurial opportunities,
the tourist trade and spin-off spending in the downtown area.
It measures favorably compared with what was there in 1968,
and with alternative uses to which the property could have
been put.
Roughly 2000 jobs were created at Faneuil Hall.15 Another
300 to 400 construction jobs were made available during each of
the construction years.16 While a substantial proportion of
the permanent jobs are in lower income categories, they provide
opportunities for second workers in a household and for youth
because they require relatively little specialized training and
often allow for part time work.
Estimated Job Creation at the
Faneuil Hall Marketplace
Sq. ft. Retail Sq. ft. Office Total Total full
Retail Jobs Office Jobs Sq. ft. time jobs
QUINCY 85,000 567 - - 85, 000 567
North 60,000 240 60,000 300 120,000 540Market
Market 78,000 312 92,000 460 170,000 772
totals 223,000 1119 152,000 760 375,000 1879
0Job/Income Distribution st Marketp19ce
$6,6000 $6 - 10,000 10 15,o000 $15,000
# #% % #%
Retail 504 5% 392 35% 56 5% 168 15%
Office 38 5% 228 30% 114 15% 380 50%
Totals 542 29% 620 33% 170 9% 548 29%
Source: Massachusetts Industry Wage Data, Dept. of Employment Security
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The pushcarts of the Bull Market provide an important
means of entry to the market for local craftspersons and artisans.
Eleven cart dealers have done so well that they have graduated
to full-sized shops.
Most of the jobs created at Faneuil Hall represent a net
injection to the employment base. In the Quincy building alone,
48 merchants started new kinds of businesses and 12 merchants
made their first start. 1 9
In 1978, $57,500,000 was spent in retail sales at Faneuil
Hall.20 While some of this represents money which would have
been spent elsewhere in the region, quite a bit represents a
net injection to the economy. Forty percent of the visitors to
the markets were tourists, and many merchants say tourists are
their best shoppers. 21
The spill-over effect in terms of jobs and sales in other
parts of downtown is substantial.
The presence of new visitors and tourists downtown and in
the North End/Waterfront area is apparent by the number of new
restaurants and shops which are opening. Bill Mirada, the North
End planner at the BRA says the number of businesses in the North
End has nearly doubled, and that none have closed their doors
for several years.22 Downtown, as well, new shops, luncheonettes
and pubs are opening up. These outlets represent more jobs for
the city residents and new opportunities for local businessmen.
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This raises the question of competition from Faneuil Hall.
Market. Only the Waterfront's commercial wharves seem to be
suffering from the competition. Other areas seem to be
benefitting, or holding their own. North End shopowners complain
about competition from the marketplace, but business is actually
good. In fact the rarketplace generates customers for the North
End business community.
In phone interviews with the inventory managers at Filene's
and Jordan Marsh I was told that the marketplace has a positive
effect on Washington Street sales. "It's terrific, the best
thing ever to happen to Boston," was their response. Both stores
have seen increases in shoppers, especially on weekends. The
marketplace draws people from the suburbs, and while they are
in town, they shop around.
On Newbury Street and in Harvard Square merchants told me
competition has been no problem. But Boylston Street is a
different story. "It can't help but affect business," said the
store manager at Boylston Street Ann Taylor. Other interviews
confirmed this picture. The area is not declining, but it is not
doing as well as pre-Faneuil Hall Market projections for the area
predicted. "A Survey of Downtown Boston's 'Captive' Retail
Market of Office Employees and New High-Rise Apartment Dwellers:
Where They Shop and Why," produced by the BRA in 1975, predicted
strong sales for all parts of the city, but especially Back Bay,
where people were, for the most part, very satisfied with
shopping there. 2 3
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More than one shopowner pointed to the fact that Newbury
Street and Harvard Square cater to a different clientele.
Shoppers at Faneuil Hall and Boylston Street are similar.
Many of the stores t names in all four areas are the same, but
the stock is of different style on JNewbury Street and in
Harvard Square. For the most part, Faneuil Hall Marketplace
sales revenues are increases to Boston spending, but some
redistribution of buying is occurring, mainly from the
Waterfront and Boylston Street areas.
Compared to other uses the property could have been put
to, the property measures favorably. Because the retail is
so dense at Faneuil Hall, as many jobs per square foot have
been created as for office space, which is usually more
labor-intensive.2
Overall, the economic impact of the Marketplace is very
positive. It is a boost to retailing in Boston, and a welcome
addition, in most retailers' eyes.
III
Traffic and Parking Impact
The tremendous draw that the marketplace has from the
suburbs has created unexpected traffic and parking issues.
Under the original assumptions, most shoppers would be arri-
ving on foot, or by public transportation. Still, a good
number of cars were anticipated, and this is one reason why
Rouse was so insitent on having parking facilities construc-
ted near the site. The proximity of the Centr.l Artery ha.s
'been an aid insetting 6ars in and out of the downtown area,
but the traffic congestion inihe market area and North End
created by shoppers looking for parking spaces is a major
problem, not yet being resolved.
To getan idea of the numbers involved, it is estimated
that on an average day, 35,000 people visit the marketplace.
The Consumer Research study determined that these people
arrived as follows:
mode percent persons
private auto 50.9 17,815
walked 20.2 7,070
subway 15.4 5,390
taxi/tour bus 7.7 2,695
MBTA bus 4.9 1,715
train 0.5 175
bicycle 0.2 70
motorcycle 0.1 35
Private Autos
density autos
low - 1.2 14,846
persons/car
high - 2.3 7,746
persons/car
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As can be seen, even under the generous assumption of 2.3
persons per car, the number of vehicles looking for parking
is sizeable.- And this does not include workers. It is rea-
sonable to assume workers arrive roughly the same way, per-
haps a few more by public transportation though. About 1000
people hold jobs at the marketplace. To mitigate the situa-
tion somewhat, the city installed 287 meters for parking be-
neath the Central Artery. But this limited number of spaces
is clearly insufficient for Faneuil Hall, Haymarket, and
Hanover Street commercial traffic (in the North End) and
spillover from the Government Center garage; all of which it
is supposed to handle. Even if the spaces turned over every
90 minutes (the average visiting time at the Marketplace
according to the Consumer Research study), in a 14 hour period
this is parking space for only 2680 cars. Aside from this
lot there is a small parking area at the foot of the market-
place, and the Government Center garage is open for public
parking in the evenings. The remainder of drivers must find
parking on the street.
The result of this parking shortage is most apparent in
the North End. Every available space downtown is czntinuously
filledbut in the North End cars are continuously double
parked because spaces are simply not available. This double
parking impedes traffic circulation making it all the more
difficult to get in and out of parking spaces as they do
become available. And the North End had poor traffic circu-
lation to begin with. Acute parking shortage has historically
been a problem in the area. The commercial development of
the Waterfront and of Faneuil Hall have compounded these
problems. The area is not prepared to handle additional
traffic.
As the neighborhood profile's historical section explains,
the major streets in the North End were developed by 1722.
They were obviously not laid out to accomodate today's traf-
fic needs. In 1919 the City Planning Board said, "a complete
network of streets and alleyways had been developed with
relatively large blocks between streets of reasonable width",
in The North End Plan. The area was built up without consid-
eration of future parking concerns. The basic problems in
the North End with regards to traffic are fourfold:
- lack of residential parking both on and off the street
- inefficient use of existing off-street parking spaces
- increasing density of use of commercial parcels
- lack of commercial parking of any kind
Only one parking facility is anywhere near Hanover Street,
the primary commercial area in the North End, and it is
reserved exclusively for residential use.
There are two main reasons why the automobile is so
heavily relied upon as the transportation mode for getting
to Faneuil Hall. First, people come' a tremendous distance,
thus public transportation is not available or is quite
inconvenient. The average travel time of a visitor to the
marketplace is 32.86 minutes, and this includes all walkers
11)
(Consumer Research study). Second, most Americans still rely
on the automobile as their primary means of transportation.
To help discourage drivers and to encourage use of the public
transportation systems, the EPA has issued a restriction on
new parking construction in downtown Boston. Instead of dis-
couraging drivers, it seems merely to be creating unnecessary
parking problems and traffic congestion. It seems that people
who want to drive are going to drive, regardless of what the
circumstances, so it would make a great deal of sense to con-
struct a large parking facility at the foot of the exit ramp
from the freeway. This way the streets could be relatively
clear of traffic circulation in search of parking. (The air
quality would probably improve as well.)
In the 1978 Neighborhood Profile, parking was named as
one of the most, if not the most serious planning problem
facing the North End/Waterfront district. The area is served
by public transportation, yet the MBTA services are greatly
underutilized. This is mainly because the stops are incon-
veniently located. Each line skirts the North End, but none
penetrate it. The Aquarium stop is a good distance from the
wharves with commercial development, and is likewise from
Faneuil Hall. The North Station stop is a long way from most
residential sections of the North End, and so is the Haymarket
stop. (Transportation facility locations are shown on a map
provided in the appendix)
1 15
The urban renewal plan called for each of the projects
to provide adequate parking for their own needs, but this
goal has not been met. While there is provision of parking
spaces on most of the wharves, these facilities are, for the
most part, inadequate. Of all the residential developments,
only Harbor Towers comes close to satisfying the residents'
demand for parking spaces. The city has yet to designate a
developer for the parking facility to be located next to
the Marketplace. Negotiations have taken place, but mean-
while the problems in the area are only getting worse. Plans
for a large parking facility to be located at the mouth of
the Sumner Tunnel have gone unattended, no action has been
taken; but the city has begun to do some things to help the
North End mitigate the problems it is facing.
The city provided a temporary lot with 110 spaces for
residents in the San Marco and Mercantile Wharf developments.
They also revised the resident parking sticker regulations,
(to favor commercial establishments), removed many unnecessary
no-parking signs, and began strict enforcement of double
parking and other traffic violations. On a longer time hori-
zon, they commissioned a study of circulation and parking
in the area., and will be implementing all first order (i.e.,
requiring little public investment) recommendations designed
to improve efficiency of existing parking facilities or to
provide for better traffic regulation. They are also consi-
dering some parking lot construction options. The important
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thing to note is that the city is cognizent of the traffic
and parking issues, and is interested in taking steps to
ameliorate the situation.
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Impact on Property Values
Ideally, to discuss trends in property values one would want
to lood at three kinds of information: 1) sales prices over
time for changes in values, 2) rent level data for changes inn
rental market, and 3) rent ot value ratios for an indication
of market expectations. (Decreases in the ratio represent
expectatio'n of increasing values.) Data on the North End
could be compared against a baseline, say the city of Boston
as a whole, or against comparative neighborhoods withing the
city for the time period of interest. This would isolate
trends on the neighborhood level.
Little information has been collected since the 1970
census on values and rents. Since this thesis is limited in
scope, I did not attempt to generate it. However, there is
data for the 1960-1970 decade. The city has compiled *some
data since 1970, but little is available post 1975 - the
year before the first phase of the Marketplace. City Hall
has offered opinions with respect to changes in property
values downtown and in the North End-Waterfront district
today, and these are also discussed below.
In a 1973 study of residential values by the BRA25,
multiple sales of individual properties were followed to deter-
mine rates of property appreciation across neighborhoods.
The North End-Central area was reported second only to the
South End and Charlestown in rate of appreciation. (The
results are arrayed in the table below.)
118
RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE PRICE TRENDS IN BOSTON
AND ITS NEIGHBORHOODS, 1960-72
(Price Indices, 1960 = 1.0)
East
Boston(Dist.1)
1.000
1.126
Year
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1971
1972
Charle stowrn
(Dist.2)
1.000
1.246
1.455
1.982
1.989
3.568
2.674
3.891
South
Boston
(Di st .3)
1.000
1.110
1.408
1.506
1.709
1 853
2-042
2.292
Central/
North End
(D~ist .4)
1,000
1.312
1.089
1.608
1.681
2.839
2.052
2.933
Year Back Bay/
Beacon Hill
(Dist.5)
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1971
1972
To read
year by
Source;
1.000
1.254
1.371
1.506
1.822
1.291
2.119
2.100
South End
(Dist-6)
1.000
.999
1.281
2.269
3.430
3.343
3.640
Jamaica
Plain
(Dist.9)
1.000
1.153
1.220
1.27
1.1401
1.635
1.495
1.462
Hyde
Roslindale Park
(Dst.12) (T1-S-07
1.000
1.080
1.246
1.247
1.274
1.491
1.519
1.584
1.000
1.058
1.138
1.204
1.396
1.578
1.509
1.601
this index, multiply the index number for a given
the 1960 value to obtain the value in that year.
Residential Property Market Values in Boston, Engle
and Avault, BRA, 1973.
1.537
1.718
2.061
2.22.7
2.474
All
Boston
1.000
1.231
1.312
1.483
1.827
1.828
1.969
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The 1975 state census showed a change in the population
trends in the city of Boston. For the first time in several
decades, the population showed an increase of 2.3 percent.
Four neighborhoods showed dramatic increases:26
South End 20.2%
North End 16.4%
Roxbury (small section) 14.0%
Charlestown 12.3%
Beacon Hill-Back Bay also outpaced the city average with an
increase of 6.3 percent. Other parts of the city showed a
decline. City officials offered an explanation for the
increases:
nemergence of the neighborhoods of young singles,
young marrieds, and elderly, reflecting, principally,
growth in the young adult, middle-class population' 27
Many of these people are buyers.
What these neighborhoods have in common are their
architectural similarities and their proximity to downtown.
Nationwide it is becoming fashionalbe to live in some urban
neighborhoods. Single young people and childless couples are
willing to pay premiums to live near downtown. Architectur-
ally and economically, townhouses and brick tenements of low
scale and of sound construction are beginning to make good
sense as investments. Quality materials are difficult to
obtain and are expensive. Housing costs are puhing new con-
struction of suburban homes out of the reach of most new-
comers to the housing market. A viable alternative is to
120
purchase and to renovate an old structure in an older city
neighborhood.
Typically the prices in these neighborhoods have been
depressed for quite some time, which makes repairs afford-
able. Renovation can even prove to be profitable if the
building has more than one unit so that some, or all, of the
building can be rented out at high rents. As more and more
people recognize the opportunity, demand for units increases,
and prices escalate. Improvements in public services to these
areas, and renovations from urban renewal help to stimulate
the rise in values as well.
As the value index illustrates, this trend back to the
city is apparent in the South End and in Charlestowm, and, to
a lesser extent, in the North End. It is important to note
that value indexes disregard units that have been upgraded.
These value increases represent increased demand, high expec-
tations, and speculation activities.
According to many who have studied the Boston housing
market, the main reason why the North End trailed the other
neighborhoods had to do with the physical characteristics
of the housing stock. The buildings in the North End were not
as attractive to the new group of consumers as those available
in other neighborhoods at similar prices.
Unlike the spacious units of South End, North End units
are small, poorly laid out, with bad or no plumbing and no
storage. Many are badly in need of large-scile repairs.
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According to the census, in 1970, fully 40% of the units
lacked some or all plumbing facilities. (Plumbing is bad in
the South End as well. The difference is that in the North
End the units are so small that whole rooms will be lost in
order to install plumbing.) A BRA survey of the neighborhood
conducted In 1973 concluded that nearly 30 percent of the
units needed $1000 or more in repairs to meet building codes.
Prices of buildings in the North End were as hih as in
other areas, and the relative architectural value was less.
As a result, the first investor activity took place in the
South End, then in Charlestown, and later in the North End.
By the end of the 1960's, new residential construction
was underway on the Waterfront. The new housing was to be
built for upper income residents with rent levels typically
twice that of units in the North End. Many of the rehabil-
itated units became condominiums. The Waterfront area is now
an established "young professional" enclave. One would expect
that the waterfront's attractiveness will start to cause
upward pressures in prices paid for units in the North End.
But what little data exists suggests that this is not yet
occurring.
Wide discrepancoy exists between prices on the Waterfront
and in the North End. For example, while a condominium in
the North End costs about 35 to $50 a square foot, on the
28Waterfront they cost between $50 and $100. According to
neighborhood planner, Bill Mirada, there has been some
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soeculation on units in the North End.29 But three factors
are credited for slowing it:
1. Widespread property investment has not occurred.
2. The percentage of owner occupied building is high.
3. There is little incentive7 to nas owing to ther strong
community ties, slow reassessment policies, and sensitive
code enforcement.
When code inspectors apreciate the owner t s abilitT to
pay for needed repairs in conducting' the code enforce-ent
process, it helps prevent forced 7ev. The BoStncr Collecge
studr of housing in the North End estimated that the owner
lives in 52 percent of the buildings in the neighborhood.
The ethnic and social ties help to make the area resistent
to turnover, at least more so than other areas.
Since 1970, about 15.5 percent of the buildings in the
North End have received investments of more than $1500. But
only three percent have received substantial rehabilitation
(32 buildings have received more than $15,000 worth of im-
provements. Half of these involved a change in occupancy.)
The levels of monetary investment from 1970-1978 are summar-
ized below:
Investment % of Buildings % of Total Buildings
No investment 656 68.2%
$1 - 1499 159 16.5
1500 - 4999 66 6.7
5000 - lL,999 39 4-1
15,000 + 32 3.3
No information 10 1.0
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Substantial Rehabilitation
Year Number
1970 - 1971 0
1972 - 1973 11
197 - 1975 8
1976 - 1978 10
Source: A Study of "The North End Housing Market", B.C. Col-
lege of Social Work, Fall, 1978.
Reassessments, even on repaired buildings have been
slow. The B.C. study found that 70 percent of the units which
received capital improvements had not been reassessed.31
More discussion of these trends follows, in the displacement
section.
Rent levels in the North End have been increasing,
but remain much lower than for the city as a whole. The rate
of increase is high, but the rent levels are low. This is
primarily on account of rent control (over 50 percent of the
buildings) and the poor quality of the housing units them-
selves. Between 1960 and 1970, the median contract rent
level in the North End rose from $34 to $65, or 91 percent. 3 2
City-wide rents rose 63 percent during the same period.3 3
Incomes in the North End, because they are moderate, are
extremely sensitive to rent increases. Still,.between 1970
and 1975 rents rose appreciably.
MEDIAN CONTRACT RENTS
Rent 197
less than $100/mo. 85.2 %
less than $150/mo. 97.0 %
more than $200/mo. less than 1%
Source: BRA Neighborhood Profile, 1977
Present estimates are delineated below:
PRESENT ESTIMATED RENT LEVELS
Type 1 BR 2 BR
Low rent $50 - $90 $70 - $90
Fair cond. $120 - $150 $140 -. $160
Good cond. $150 - $250 $150 - $300
Luxury $400 +
Source: BRA Neighborhood Profile, 1977
3 & L BR
370 - 0
$200 - $250
$250 - $300
The North End rent level increase from 1960 to 1970 of
91 percent is high among Boston neighborhoods. The city-
wide average increases were only 63.3 percent for the same
period. While rent levels have not been compiled for the
1970 to 1980 period as yet, there is evidence to suggest
that the North End is still outpacing the city as a whole.
In comparison, between 1960 and 1970 residential values
increased 2.933 times in the North End, according to the
BRA index. For the city as a whole, values increased only
1.969 times during the same period.3h The rent to value
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l_975
40.0 %
80-0 5
2.0 %
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ratio for the North End from 1960 to 1970 was slightly
lower than that of the city as a whole: .65 as compared to
.67. This represents optimism about value increases in the
North End as compared to the city as a whole.
The BRA published a rgort in 1973 on retail space in
the city of Boston. The report showed that from 1966 to 1973,
there was little net gain in retail space, despite construc-
tion of the Prudential and the Waterfront renewal on account
of many closings. About 250 stores closed in the dowmtown
and Back Bay area during that period.3 6
The report suggested that retail sales in the Boston
area were going to increase, and that 1.5 to 2.5 million
additional sqare feet of retail space could be supported
within the next decade. (At the time, that much was planned,
or already under construction) This projection assumed
attraction of suburban shoppers to the core area.
Recent evidence suggests that most retail space in the
city is in high demand. Exceptions are: some parts of
Boylston Street, and on the Commercial Wharves. Commerci!l
sp-ace in the Washington Street area is doing good volume,
38according to interviews with area merchants ; and upgrading
activities in the area certainly attest to that fact.
Faneuil Hall Marketplace was key in drawing the subur-
ban shoppers into the city, and deserves credit for improving
values of commercial space, at least in adjacent areas,
aside from the Waterfront.
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A recent BRA report on office space39 in the city of
Boston showed that after a 30 year period of no construction,
office building starts began to rise in the last half of the
60's. Nearly E.8 million square feet of office space was
added during that period. In 1970 the lowest vacancy rate
of 1.7 percent was attained. The 70's marked a period
of greatest construction activity. Nearly 10.8 million
square feet were Pdded. Maximun vacancy rate accirred in
April of 1977, just prior to the South Market's opening,
15.1 percent. (Five million square feet had come on to the
market at once in 1975). At this high rate of vacancy, it
had become a buyers' market. Market conditions not with-
standing, new buildings continued to ask for high rents at
$10 to $14 a square foot. With an additional supply of
801,000 square feet in 1975, vacnacy rates reached a post
depression high, until rents for office space were driven
down to a level of approximately $9/square foot.
According to a local lender- this situation has
changed since 1975. Due to a decrease in vacancy rate to
10.1% in 1978, office space is now able to command rents up
to $14 a square foot, and the market is tightening.
The BRA report indicated that it is primarily the older
office stock that is feeling a fall-off in demand.4;2 Rehab-
ilitation of older structures is starting to occur, especially
in the Financial District and near Faneuil Hall. Such
activity is a sign of increasing values.
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Social Impact
A visitor to downtown Boston today, after 15 years, might
not recognize it, so much has changed. More than the built form
has changed. The nature and locus of daily activities in the
city have also been transformed. The dialects are changing, and
the style - the atmosphere - is different from Boston of Yester-
year. It is these demographic and activity changes which measure
the social impact of recent developments.
The cause of these changes is a complex interaction of many
forces, to be sure. Part is due to the macroeconomic signs of
the times -- for example, the shift of our workforce from pre-
dominantly blue collar to increasing service and office sectors
of the economy. Part is a result of the widespread city planning
and urban renewal efforts initiated in the early 1960s under
Ed Logue. In any event, very little can be attributed to one
single factor, each project reinforced general trends and made
its own contributions, resulting in what we see today.
The characteristics of the people who live and work in or
around the Faneuil Hall area have changed. Their activities and
needs have changed a great deal as well. The former tenants
of the Marketplace were wholesale food merchants. Now, in their
place there are retailers. The wholesalers moved to the suburbs,
and at Faneuil Hall are shops which ten years ago were afraid to
go downtown. The marketplace used to be neglected: a crude,
resilient assemblage, faithfully replicating the traditions of
commerce in the New England heritage. The area was decisively
ethnic, rich with aromas, cluttered with spoilage and was die-
gusting to many "proper" Bostonians. Today's marketplace has
ethnic participation, but is broadly representative. The theme
is more international than ethnic. The architect's intent is
good taste. The marketplace is chic; it has polished window
displays. Different people go there than went in the past, and
they go for different reasons. The very character has changed.
The commerce and harbor trade for which this area was
originally constructed dried up a half century ago. Yet the
area retained its traditional flavor many years thereafter.
In recent times the surrounding business district has grown and
changed tremendously. The financial center is now encroaching
on the marketplace. Thousands of government workers are employed
at the Government Center, in City Hall and the John F. Kennedy
Federal Building, among others. Most of the older structures
in the area have recently undergone renovation; even the
luncheonettes and local pubs have upgraded their decor to attract
a different group of consumers.
The Shoppers Survey, conducted by the Rouse Company in 1978,
revealed the broad economic and age distribution of visitors to
the marketplace. (The Shopper profile was included in the case
study section, please refer back.)
The survey also showed that people come from throughout the
metropolitan region and beyond to downtown Boston. The marketplae
is -a civic amenity in a social sense. People go there to see
1 29
other people, to taste the diversity of the city, and to be
someplace unique. Eating and shopping bring young and old
together in a common purpose. The tourist traffic has been
greatly bolstered. The markets used to be a part of town people
avoided when showing Boston to tourists. While they represented
the backbone of New England economic history, they were an
abhorrence to look at, much less to walk through. In its
present form, the marketplace serves more people and a wider
cross-section of people than ever before. In fact, it has
achieved notoriety worldwide as a place to visit.
It is hard to overstate the visual impact the renewal
process has had on the City of Boston. (Photos are included
in the appendix). Faneuil Hall Marketplace plays a pivotal
role. As stated in the original Urban Renewal Plan, it is
located in the passageway between downtown, the harbor, and
the North End residential community. As highrises went up on
all sides, the marketplace was the reminder of the original
scale. Today it is a favorite place to take tourists -- it is
an aesthetic amenity.
The whole urban renewal process is having a profound
influence on who lives near downtown, and who makes use of the
amenities. While to some attracting the suburbanites might be
viewed as a great thing, to some local residents these visitors
represent an intrusion in their neighborhood. On the other
hand, Faneuil Hall offers some local advantages as well. It
generates customers for local business outlets. It is a fun
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place to visit, and a source of teenage employment for the
area. The local residents have mixed feelings about the
marketp1ace. Like all developments it offers some good and
some bad.
The construction of 1000 units of lux:ury housing on the
waterfront meant installation of some beautiful public amen-
ities - parks, playgrounds and landscaping. But it also
meant "gentrifiers" to many moderate income area residents.
People with different tastes, incomes, lifestrles and ethnic
characteristics started living next door. Soon these people's
friends and relatives would want to move into the area, and
to start buying up houses. As Italians move out, families
are the first to leave, and in their place come young, child-
less, anglo-saxon professionals. The building of elderly
housing meant the congregation of those who provided the
community's link with the old country, instead of spreading
them throughout the community. As the Waterfront project
developed, more and more outsiders began to appear, and the
residents feared losing control over their neighborhood.
The social fabric of a tight community was beginning to erode.
The presence of downtown and harbor amenities, combined
with changes in tastes and locational preferences on the
part of young professionals in Boston is leading to serious
housing pressures in the North End residential market. These
newcomers are willing to pay considerably more for housing
than the existing residents are able. The availability of
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high quality, newly constructed units helped to siphon the
demand away from the established community, but at the same
time has made the area as a whole a more desireable place
to live. From a buyer's standpoint the area was perfect:
a long history of deflated values, new housing available for
rent or for purchase, and a rapidly appreciating market.
As a result, over a short period many outsiders moved into
the area, a good percentage of whom chose to become owners,
so they purchased their units. The North End is very vulner-
able to demographic change.
This new population is viewed as a threat by the origi-
nal residents. They fear loss of political and social con-
trol over their neighborhood. Their most serious concern,
however is displacement - being forced to move out of the
community to make way for a wealthier class. The city plan-
ners would like to see the Italian section remain, at least
so far as the restaurants and bakeries are concerned, but
beyond that their camittment to the Italian community is
cursory, at best. The city fathers do not much care who lives
where, so long as the people are decently housed, and that the
socialdislocation and emotional strain which is caused by
forced departure is avoided, wherever possible. It is to
the city's advantage to see its housing stock upgraded. It
means more tax dollars. The newer population requires fewer
services, such as schools. Bill Mirada, the BRA neighborhood
planner for the North End, expressed his sympathy for the
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situation in the following statement: "the phenomena (of
neighborhood change) is inevitable, and there is little that
the city can or should do to prevent it." The neighborhood
residents disagree.
Vocal residents have stated they feel the Waterfront
redevelopment is to blame for North End housing pressures.
While this statement is naive, nationwide there is a trand
back to central city neighborhood by this group known as
"gentrifiers" (young, mostly white, mostly childless, profes-
sionals),there is no auestion but that the Waterfront develop-
ment has made the North End more attractive to these immi-
grants. This spillover effect of upgrading-induced displace-
ment - is what is mainly at issue. Before concluding whether
it is or is not occurring, and whether or not it is a prob-
lem the city should be concerned with, more evidence must be
reviewed. Because displacement has become a political issue,
it is dealt with more fully in a separate section below.
For now it is imoortant tonote that the characteristics
of the population residing in the North End, waterfront and
downtown areas are changing, in the following ways:
- age. The number of elderly and of families is decreasing.
Population increases are primarily in the 20-35 and 45-6
years of age categories, representing childless young adult
immigration, and many "empty nesters".
- income. In the aggregate, incomes are rising. But the
income categories which are seeing increasing numbers are at
age groups
CHANGING AGE CHARACTERISTICS, 1950 - 75
1950 1960
number percent number percent
1970
number percent
0-4 years
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-214.
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65-74
75 and over
TOTALS
1,394
1,109
965
1 144
1,378
2,918
2,048
1,436
816
882
968
316
15,374
9.0%
7.2%
6.3%
7.4%
9.0%
19.0%
13.3%
9.3%
5.3%
5.7%
6.3%
2.1%
100.0%
929
853
935
832
917
1,475
1 ,735
1,441
503
544
1W72
505
11,841
7.9%
7.2%
7.9%
7.0%
7.7%
12.5%
14.7%
12.2%
4.3%
4.6%
9-9%
4.3%
591
628
642
773
895
189
121
503
736
568
795
693
100.0% 109134
Source: Census data for North end tracts
* based on BRA telephone survey data,
1975*
percent
5.8%
6.2%
6.3%
7.6%
8.8%
11.7%
11- 1%
14.8%
7.3%
5.6%
7.8%
6.8%
100.0%
13.3%
7.8%
10.5%
15.8%
15.0%
15.5%
13.9%
100.0%
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CHANGE IN INCOME CHARACTERISTICS, 1970 - 1975
1970
% of North End
residents
1975
% of North End
residents
% Change
1970 - 1975
less than
$6000
6000 -
$10,000
10,000-
$15,000
15,000 -
$25,000
$25,000 +
30.5
37.0
26.0
0.1
36.5
28.0
19.8
12.6
+ 6.5%
- 9.0%
- 6.2%
+ 12.5%
+ 2.4%0.0
Source: 1970 U.S. census, 197.5 BRA survey.
the high and the low end, incomes are becoming increasingly
polarized.
As evident in the changing age and income characteris-
tics, the North End is experiencing changes in:
- household size. More and more single persons and
childless couples are moving into the area, families and ex-
tended households are on the decline.
Accompanying this change is a shift in the unit composi-
tion to reflect population demographics.
Income
Changes in Household Size and Unit Composition
Existin Units
Unit % in 1970
Rooms
1-2 75 54% were occu-
pied by one or3-5 8two persons, the
6+ 81 remainder by
three or more
density in 1970: 2.58 people/room
density in 1960: 2.94 people/room
New Construction/Rehab
mostly 1-3 rooms/
apartment. mostly
occupied by one or
two persons
density: less than
1 person per room
From: Housing in the North E Strategies for Low and
Moderate Income Housing Development, 1978'
- occupation. The area is increasing rapidly in terms
of white collar and professional occupants, and students.
Blue collar workers are declining. More of the newcomers
hold jobs than is true of longer term residents. (Refer
to the charts on Change in Occupational and Age Characteris-
tics for details)
- ethnicity. Fewer of the newcomers are of Italian
origin. A high percentage of those leaving the area are of
CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
BRA telephone survey, 1976, all residents
How many persons in your household work:
Full Time
Part Time
Don't Work
35.5%
22.3%
42.2%
Boston Police Listing
New Residents: 1970 - 1974
Workers 71.5%
Students 10.9%
At Home/Retired 17.6%
Occupation
Professional!
semi-professional
Secretarial
BRA Survey
7 of households
13.7%
1o.8
Student
Manual Labor
At Home/Retired
31.0
42.0
New Residents, Boston
1971 1972 1973
22.0 22.0
15.7 25.6
4.9 12.2
23.8 23.1
33.3 16.8
24.6
26.4
11.9
21.4
15.0
Police
1974
24.8
19.8
10.8
Listing
Average
26.6
23*8
10.9
21.9
17.9
Profile, BRA, 1977Source: District
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Italian origin. The net result is decrease in the percent
of persons of Italian origin in the North End.
Decen
Foreign b
American
Mixed
Source:
Origin of North End Residents
t Census Police Survey,
1201970 1971 1972
o-rn 33% 32% 28.551% 15%
born 32% 67.6% 71.5% 85%
35% - - - not tabulated
BRA Neighborhood Profile
New Residents
1973 1971
20% 16.3"
80% 83.7%;
- - - - -e
This is considered a concern, because Italians are the longer
term, most stable residents of the community. The 1975 BRA
Survey revealed the following:
Time lived in
North End
3 or less years
over ten years
Percent born
in Italy
13%
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As ethnic residents tend to have lower incomes, they are the
first to be displaced from an area. As revealed above, of
those with long term ties in the North End (greater than ten
years) almost a third are ethnic residents. May I suggest
this is one major reason why the city should be concerned
with displacement in the North End.
Each of these population chracteristic shifts imply
changes in social behavior and in social service requirements.
Some of these implications are apparent. Upward pressure on
housing prices will continue as the incomes of incominr
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residents continue to rise. Pressures to convert buildings
to condominiums and to subdivide larger units into several
smaller ones will increase. 'Buildings will be upgraded to
meet the demand requirements of the new and more affluent
housing consumers, and rents will be de-controlled (with sub-
stantial renovation) and will rise out of the grasp of exis-
ting tenants. The strength of the Italian community will
begin to erode as the composition of the neighborhood is
diluted, and fractionization of political interest groups
wAill result. Conflicting demands for public services will
emerge as polarization of the population continues. And
most threatening of all to the old time residents who-want
to remain living there is induced displacement, - being
priced out or forced out of their current homes.
So much for what is happening in the neighborhood. The
question which now needs to be asked is, to what extent has
the Faneuil Hall Marketplace restoration played a hand in
catalyzing all of these changes. The Faneuil Hall Marketplace
has had a very limited influence on North End housing market.
The development of luxury housing along the harbor (part
of the same urban renewal plan) has played a much larger
role. The marketplace is just one piece, albeit an impor-
tant one, of the larger scale changes that have occurred in
the North End and downtown.
The marketolace attracts tourists and suburbanites into
the city. It has also enhanced the desireability of the
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waterfront-area as a place to live. Its effect is local, for
the most part. Its spillover into the residential neighbor-
hood is mainly in the form of tourists, for which the bene-
fits might well outweigh the disadvantages. To some extent
Rouse was speculating on neighborhood change in the area.
His third building emphasized the high end of the retail
market, requiring upper income shoppers to sustain it, not
the ethnic population of the North End. While they hoped to
capture the local residential shoppers, the shops were
designed mainly for the incoming group. The extent of the
change seen in the'social characteristics of central 3oston
and in the North End is the result of the combination of new
investments, changing times, and the removal of what was
there before. In that process the marketplace played a part.
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Residential and Business Displacement
Over the course of the Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project,
the concerns of local residents regarding displacement changed.
At outset the.questions related to direct displacement: If the
city restored the Marketplace and changed its character, what
was to happen to the merchants who were doing business there?
Likewise, if the city converted deteriorating residential
structures to luxury condominiums, what was to become of the
original tenants who lived there? One answer to these questions
was provided in the federal Urban Renewal legislation - relocation
assistance.
Under urban renewal guidelines, any person forced to leave
a property on account of government-sponsored renewal activities
was entitled to relocation payments sufficient to cover all
expenses incurred in moving. Payments were provided both to
businesses and families, and applied to publically and privately
funded activities undertaken in accordance with the Urban Renewal
Plan. Attention was focused on people displaced as a direct
result of governmental actions.
It was evident to planners that a necessary step in the
slum clearance and redevelopment process was temporary or
permanent displacement of existing inhabitants. It was inevitable
that people would have to be moved, at least while construction
work was in process. It was also conceivable that the people
affected might not return to the original area for one of three
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reasons: 1. they would choose not to move again, 2. they would
not be able to afford to live or operate their business in the
area after upgrading, or 3. the area might lose its appeal to
residents and businesses, once changes had been made. The
constitution provided safeguards to prevent seizure of personal
property without justifiable cause and compensation. For this
and other socially minded reasons, relocation assistance payments
were a part of the urban renewal activities in a project area.
There was a relocation staff for each project.
Relocation assistance was a help, but it was not the entire
answer to displacement. So people get paid to move, did that
make it all right to force people to leave an area? Critics
addressed attention to the willingness of people to be relocated,
and to the psychological trauma and human costs of displacement
caused by urban renewal activities. With the Faneuil Hall Market
project, direct displacement was a pretty mild issue.
The original tenants of the North, South and Quincy Market
buildings (1960s) were predominantly fruit and produce and meat
wholesalers. The waterfront buildings were used for warehousing,
and there were some wholesale suppliers scattered throughout.
While a few families resided in commercial structures on the
Waterfront, this was not the case in the Faneuil Hall markets.
That area was non-residential, so no families were involved in
relocation activities (from the city's point of view). The basic
problem with the area was underutilization. There was, at first,
talk of tearing the structures down, and later talk focused on
changing the use in the area.
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Aware of planning activities going on at city hall, and
facing economic diseconomies of a downtown location, the produce
merchants formed an organization to consider the possibility of
moving to the suburbs in the mid-60s. The suburbs were more
accessible; and there would be more space and modern facilities.
In 1968 and 1969, the produce merchants moved to Everett, at the
city's expense. They all moved together; Everett is now the
produce distribution center for the region.
The meat merchants had similar concerns, but were not as
well organized. A trickle of migration began in the late 60s,
but most did not move until several years later. By this time
the city knew the designation would be the Faneuil Hall Market-
place, and merchants who wanted to were encouraged to stay
downtown. The meat merchants, for the most part, relocated in
South Boston, near the Southeast Expressway. Relocation was
completed before the city began rehabilitation work in late 1973.
The city had paid for most of the meat merchants' expenses.
On the Waterfront and at Faneuil Hall 644 merchants were
relocated in all, (the figure is not disaggregated), plus a
handful of families (all of whom chose to move to the suburbs).44
In all, over $4,800,000 was awarded in relocation assistance,
and nearly all of that came from federal sources.45 The merchants
who moved seem very satisfied with their new locations, and their
businesses are doing well. Many, if not most, consider the
move fortunate.
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About a dozen of the original tenants, most notably Durgin
Park restaurant, chose to stay at the marketplace. Durgin Park
was permitted to retain ownership of its building, and stayed
open during construction work. The food merchants who stayed
paid only pre-restoration rent levels for a period of three years,
and now their leases are being renewed at sustainable rent levels.4
None have been forced to leave the marketplace.
The next neighborhood displacement concern was, if the area
is upgraded and modernized, will the fruit and vegetable cart
dealers of the Haymarket area be pushed out, and will the North
End merchants be forced to undertake repairs and improvements
they cannot afford? The City Council answered these concerns
with an ordinance stating that the cart dealers would be allowed
to stay where they were under any and all circumstances. But,
for the North End, the answer was not so simple. Legislation
cannot stop the influence of economics. The increase in commercial
traffic through the area has made the area very attractive, and
shop dealers and restaurant owners get bought out. This might
greatly please the individual owners, who see a hefty return on
investment, but it also means that the area's personality will
begin to change. Restaurants and shops will be upgraded. The
authentic Italian flavor-will be lost, and the needs of the local
residents will take a back seat to those of tourists and other
visitors to the area. The question was, how should and how can
the city look out for the residents' best interest. At city
hall the question was asked differently - should the city do
anything to protect the residents' interests? In the initial
planning stages these sorts of questions were not answered.
The planners either did not foresee secondary economic consequences,
or shied away from issues like whose interests should take priority,
or else they chose not to be concerned with these issues. In
effect a policy of inaction favored the new groups - the visitors
and new upper income residents in the area.
Today the neighborhood residents have considerable concern
about the issue of indirect residential displacement. Residents
fear social changes in their neighborhood, they fear being forced
out of the area due to economic forces, and they do not have many
alternative places to go. The problem is especially acute for
renters, who do not benefit from capital gains; for mom-and-pop
corner commercial outlets, who rely on the existing mix of resi-
dents and social ties for their livelihood; and for low income
residents, for whom housing resources are scarce and the cost of
moving a real hardship.
The new image of the Waterfront district (young Boston pro-
fessionals) has a catalytic effect on the surrounding neighbor-
hood, encouraging reinvestment, renovation, and inducing changes
in the population mix. A spill-over effect of upgrading is un-
avoidable, because the renewal effort was successful in attracting
these people. But because these residents are being displaced
as an indirect result of public actions (regardless of how
predictable the outcome was), they are not eligible for relocation
assistance. In the North End a task force has been formed to
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advocate a position for the residents on this issue. While they
have been vocal, they have not been overly persuasive or influential
with city hall.
Bill Mirada, the neighborhood planner, explained the current
situation in the North End as follows: 7 There have been a few
instances of evictions for condominium conversions or unit up-
grading in recent years. Residents dislocated by fire have found
that there are no replacement units available anywhere in the
North End. Rents are rising, maybe only $5 or $10 dollars a month
each year, but for people in these income groups, even a small
increment creates considerable hardship. Pressures on the housing
market are readily apparent. But, as Mirada points out, this
situation is no different in many other parts of the city. Down-
town neighborhoods are coming into vogue.
While the instances of eviction are statistically insignificant,
they are traumatic for the individuals'involved, and psychologically
very powerful in the neighborhood. Fears have been created in the
hearts and minds of the residents - what, and who will be next?
Still, the neighborhood is not able to rally arouxnd a stand on
the displacement issue. Many neighborhood residents stand to gain
financially from the gentrification process. For them it means
finally having the long-awaited opportunity to move to the suburbs
and to leave the North End. Such "upward mobility" has been many
a family's dream. Others, especially social and religious leaders,
are terribly concerned about the eroding sense of community,
social dislocation and splits in the Italian community that the
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process is creating. But with these divergent views, the task
force cannot be an effective advocate for those residents who
stand to lose from the process.
The city has chosen to do little on the issue to date. They
say the evidence supporting forced residential displacement simply
is not there. And they are correct, in one-sense or the word.
(The evidence for displacement is reviewed below.) In fact, if
they chose to believe that displacement was occurring, many of
the warning signs are readily apparent, and there are steps they
could be taking to prevent the situation from becoming a crisis.
Evidence of Displacement
A recent HUD interim report and several other papers on
displacement have identified four main sources of displacement
pressures:48
1. purchase of units for rehabilitation, resulting
in eviction of existing tenants
2. upgrading and subdivision of units resulting in
increased rents or units then inappropriate for
family use
3. reassessment of a neighborhood, increasing tax
requirements prohibitively, or forcing raised
rents, the result is people having to sell
or move
4. social and demographic changes in an area, which
make it undesirable to families, elderly or other
income residents.
But none deal with the issue of rising housing costs which
are making survival a challenge to many moderate income families,
fixed income individuals and ethnic groups who face discrimination
in the real estate market. Housing costs are the major issue
facing North End residents today. We will look at this issue first,
and return to the other sources of displacement later.
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The incomes of
lowest in the city.
by income groups in
North End residents are small, among the
The table below arrays North End residents
1975 according to the BRA survey:
Income Levels in the North End
Income Percentage of Households
under $6000 36.5%
6,000 - 8,000 12.6
8,000 - 10,000 16.2
10,000 - 15,000 19.8
15,000 - 25,000 12.6
25,000 and above 2.4
100.0%
Determinations of affordable housing costs done by HUC for a
four-person family in 1975 showed that a family with an income
less than $7000 a year could not afford to pay anything for
housing. At an $8000 income, only $32 per month was affordable.
At $9000, only $92 could be spent, and at $10,000 annually in
income, only $150 per month could be spent on housing. Sixty-
five percent of the residents in the North End have incomes less
than $10,000 a year. Contract rent levels have been inching up
in the North End, and they are beginning to approach the income
limits of many families. In fact, the most recent census
discovered that more than 27 percent of the residents were
already paying more than they houad fo±housing. Changes in
median contract rent levels are shown below. 4 9
Median Contract Rents
rent 1-970 197
less than $100/month 85.2% 40.05
less than $150/month 97.0% 80.0%
more than $200 less than 2.0%+
1.0%
It is significant to note that families earning less than $7000
per year are considered incapable of paying for housing. In the
North End, 36.5 percent of all residents earn less than $6000.
It is easy to see how $5 or $10 in this instance can make a
sizeable difference.
Traditionally, the North End has resisted the intrusion of
subsidized housing. Proud, with strong family networks and
undoubtedly strong fears and prejudices against other ethnic
groups, they resented the idea of publically assisted housing.
In recent years they have become more amenable to the construction
of elderly housing in the area, and 314 subsidized elderly units
were constructed as part of the urban renewal project. This is
one way the BRA has helped to prevent these people's displacement
from the area. But the number of subsidized units in this neigh-
borhood is grossly insufficient. The problem of rising housing
costs will contribute to other pressures leading to social and
economic changes in the area's residents.
Measuring residential displacement is a slippery task.
Frequently there are several reasons behind a family's departure
from a neighborhood. It is difficult to assess their true reason
for moving, and the extent to which it was involuntary. Besides,
finding someone who has already left the neighborhood can be
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a very hard task. Displacement is considered a problem to the
extent that it creates hardship for displacees and to the extent
that relocation is unwanted. For some families gentrification
translates into better housing opportunities in other areas, so
not all movers can be considered a part of the displacement
problem. These measurement questions aside, there are case
examples of evictions and foreclosures, of neighbors and family
ties being severed, and other personal hardships which members of
the North End community can recall. While these examples say
nothing about the magnitude of the problem, they at least illus-
trate that it exists.
Perhaps the best way of approaching the measurement issue
is to examine the strength of the sources of displacement
pressures vis a vis rent levels, building permits, assessment
patterns and demographic data. For the North End these data
show that the process of change is still slow, but it is happening.
Rent levels are increasing. Between 1960 and 1970 rent
levels in the North End rose an average of 91.2 percent, from
$34 to $65 per month, on average. Citywide rents rose only 63.3
percent. While data on rent levels has not been collected for
the 1970 decade yet, discussions with neighborhood planners
suggest that rent increases are still outpacing citywide levels
by a substantial margin. Property values are growing more quickly.
This is indication of increased demand for units in the North End
as opposed to other sections of town.
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RENT'LEVELS IN THE NORTH END, SINCE 1970
median
contract
rent
percentage of total renters
1970 1975
less than
$100/month
less than
$150/month
more than
$200/month
85.2%
97.0%
less than
1.0%
PRESENT ESTIMATED RENT LEVELS
TYPE OF
UNIT 1 BR 2 BR 3 & 14 BR
Low rent $50 - $90
Fair Condition $120 - 1,50
Good Condition $150 - $250
Luxury
$70 - 890
$140 - $160
$150 - $300
$70 - $100
$200 - 250
$250 - $300
$400 +
Source: Housing in-the North End, Strategies for Low and Moderate
Income Housing Development, pp. 35-36.
Analysis based on U.S. Census, 1970 and BRA Survey.
80.0o
2% +
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Neighborhood demographic trends show that upper income
residents, primarily non-Italian and childless, are coming into
the area at a greater rate than is representative of the neigh-
borhood as a whole. The majority of these people are being housed
in new Waterfront units, however. A 1973 BRA survey showed that
of the 775 households in the renewal area, 38 percent had incomes
over $25,000, and only 16 percent earned less than $15,000. The
1980 census will show to what extent upper income residents are
penetrating the North End.
Building permits are increasing, but some of these are due
to the operations of the city's HIP (home improvement) program.
Roughly three percent of the units in the North End received sub-
stantial rehabilitation (greater than $15,000 worth of improvements)
between 1970 and 1978, representing only 10 percent of all improve-
ment work done in the North End. Rehabilitation is mainly taking
place on the periphery of the neighborhood, at a slow, but con-
tinuous pace. Since 1972, roughly five structures a year have
been rehabilitated for incoming residents.
Reassessment is not occurring in the North End, not even for
upgraded structures. The Boston College study estimated that
approximately 70 percent of those structures which had received
improvements had not even been re-assessed.50 The reason for
this is two-fold. One, the city is sensitive about the reper-
cussions of reassessment. Second, a citywide reassessment is
scheduled following the upcoming election, so it has been
considered inappropriate to reassess before then.
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As the city contends, a review of the data shows a crisis
is not there. The evidence of residential displacement is weak.
But building rehabilitation activity and increased market values
of properties are warning signs of the future. There is definitely
smoke, and if there is not fire already, there soon will be. It
is foolish to ignore this fact.
Business displacement occurs as competition increases, rents
increase, taxes increase and as neighborhood demographics change.
Small ma-and-pa corner shops, restaurants and stores are particu-
larly vulnerable. Another result of this trend is increasing
cost of entry for business in the area. Young people in the
neighborhood desiring to stay might have to go to other parts of
the city to find business opportunities.
No data has been collected as to who owns or operates the
new stores and restaurants in the North End. While some shops
have no doubt been opened by North End residents, many probably
have not. The North End Businessman's Association has voiced
complaints about rising costs of doing business, and competition
for space is vigorous.
Short of data on ownership, observations can be made. Commer-
cial establishments in the North End are upgrading to attract
higher income clientele. Costs of entry are clearly increasing,
and so is area competition. Taxes are increasing for area
commercial establishments.51 Business displacement, if not
already occurring, will be soon.
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City Strategies for Avoiding Displacement
There are several things the city could have done, and
there is still time to control the situation if they should
choose to take affirmative steps to protect the neighborhood
for its existing residents. Let us review for a moment how
this situation came about.
Planning, in the 1960s, was a visionary activity -- one
which permitted practitioners to translate their tastes,
preferences and prejudices into the future of the urban landscape.
Many, if not most, planners of that period espoused liberal
values, such as environmental quality, racial and economic
integration and balance, etc., and at the same time were unaware
of macroeconomic issues like declining tax base, rising unemploy-
ment and increasing concentration of low and moderate income
residents, minority groups and female-headed households in core
urban areas. Their concern about these issues guided their
planning, and perhaps blinded them to long range economic trends
and policy implications. The city of Boston had some serious
problems, still, the BRA was myopic in its approach to urban
planning. Attention to implementation and long-run consequences
was short-changed by obsession with initiating change and building
new and modern facilities (for upper income groups).
The late 1950s and early 60s were periods of high optimism.
Money was plentiful to deal with some of the basic urban dilemmas,
and it was believed that the poor could be attended to later.
I -,I
In Boston, a value-laden decision was made to focus efforts on
attracting the wealthy and upper middle class back into the city.
Jim Rouse saw the writing on the wall. He felt that the
reinvestment activities would take hold. He had faith in the
long run appeal of cities, and was sensitive to the economic
trends which would make the cities viable and attractive again -
trends the city planners failed to recognize. These were some
of the reaons he chose to invest in Boston. In a sense, he bet
on the return of higher income residents to the area. His shops
certainly do not cater to the needs of the existing North End
residents. The city planners were not so farsighted, or preferred
not to care, for they devised few strategies to mitigate the
ramifications of their own policies.
In retrospect, it is troubling to think that planners,
rather than struggling to improve existing circumstances, or
to deal with underlying causes for problems, chose instead to
plan for a "new Boston". A natural outgrowth of this sort of
demagoguery, it would seem, is resentment and resistance to
change on the part of neighborhood residents. Urban renewal
investments in new infrastructure and aesthetic and cultural
amenities coupled with the economic forces we are now experiencing,
such as increased construction costs, rising costs of heating
and automobile fuel, to mention a few, are, or will result in
an economic struggle for the right to live in some of the core
city areas (like the Waterfront and the North End). There is
less federal money available now to assist low income residents
I'1 5
in combatting these pressures. Displacement is an outgrowth of
this struggle under today's circumstances.
The decisions of the past have been made, but there are steps
the city can take now which will ease the pressure induced by
these natural and planner-created problems facing the neighborhood
residents. Possible city responses to the residential displace-
ment issue include the following:
sensitive code enforcement - taking into account the
means of building owners when conducting inspections
rent control - to prevent the forced eviction of tenants
unable to pay what the market will bear
no reassessments on unrehabilitated units - to prevent
the necessitation of upgrading in order to meet
required tax payments on the property
controls on speculation and conversion activities -
eviction penalties, high capital gains, taxes, re-
quired relocation payments, similar to the D.C.
legislation ,
provision of subsidies for new and existing units, but
especially for newly rehabilitated units, so that
existing tenants can remain there
While these steps will not prevent neighborhood change, in
the long run, that is inevitable, they will do a great deal for
the sense of comfort among area residents today.
Business displacement can be eased by the provision of low
interest improvement loans for neighborhood businesses. Care must
be taken in re-assessing these businesses as well.. Neither of
these policies solve the problem of rising cost of entry or of
competition, however. It may be that these are irresolvable
consequences of area upgrading.
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COMPARISON OF IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS
FANEUIL HALL OFFICE I0TEL NO RESTORA-
MARKETPLACE ALTERNATIVE TION OF AREA
FISCAL
IMPACT ++ + +
ECONOMIC
IMPACT
Employment
high pay ++ ++ 0 0
middle + + + ++
low pay ++ + ++ 0
Land Values
commercial + ++ ++
office + 0
residential ++ ++ 0
SOCIAL
IMPACT
Change in
demographics some some little none
displacement
(direct) considerable all all none
displacement
(induced) some some little none
OTHER
IMPACTS
Visual +++ + +
Historic 
-- 0Value
Traffic and
Parking
KEY: ++ strongest beneficial effect, + strong contribution
0 no effect, - negative effect, -- creates problems or nuisances
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Footnotes for Imoact Assessment Section
1From Faneuil Hall Marketolace: The Differential in City
and State Tax Yield, BRA publication drawn from tax
assessor's records.
2 took 1964 assessments and multiplied by 1979 tax rates.
3Provided by John Sayers, BRA Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Urban
Renewal project director.
4See case study for details.
5From interview with Henry Penta, Ward 3 (downtown/NTorth End
are) commercial property assessor, City of Boston.
6Boston Globe, Spring 1975.
7From interview with Scott Ditch,
8In the BRA report, Differential in City and State Tax Yield,
the city estimated tax payments at $1.,17,031. But this
estimate was based on guesses as to revenues, and made
no adjustments. I consider the Rouse figures more reli-
able.
9 1n 1968 the total assessed value of the three buildinas was
$1,987,000. 7,000,000/.12 = $26,416,667, for a net
increase of $24,430,000. Capitalization rate: 12%.
10 Interview with Henry Penta, April 1979.
11From the BRA, South End Urban Renewal Environmental Impact
Review, April 1979, p. 228.
1 2Based on Rouse Company estimations
1 3 See 11 above
14 Figures for hotel assessment provided by tax assessment
office (names withhel by request).
15The Rouse Company says there are 121 so. ft./employee (full
and part time workers) in the Quincy Building. I assume
150sq. ft./full time worker (FTE). Based on figures
produced by the BRA South End EIR report and MIT LAP EIR
report on typical square footage recuirements per employ-
ee for retail and office sectors, I chose the following
North and South Market Assumotions:
250 so. ft./employee - retail
200 so. ft./employee - office
The table provided on page shows the worker calcu-
lations.
1 6 According to the Study on Environmental Impact Assessment,
Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T., 1976.
New construction requires 30 man-years per $1 million
construction cost. Rehab is more labor intensive, so,
assuming 40 man-years per million, 900 - 1200 construc-
tion jobs were created, 300 - L00 annually.
1 7 See 15 above for derivations of figures and sources.
18 Based on Massachusetts Industry WageData, Dept. of Employ-
ment Security.
1 9From promotional materials on the Faneuil Hall Marketplace.
2 0Based on sales tax data, city's report on Differential
Tax Yields.
21li e er "All that is Gold does not Glitter", March
31, 1979.
2 2Interview with Bill Mirada, Neighborhood planner
23 By Marie Keubman, Peter Menconeri, BRA research, p. -
24See 15 for sources, and the table for calculations, Esti-
mated Permanent Job creation at Faneuil Hall Marketplace.
25BRA Research, "Changes in Residential Property Values in
the City of Boston", 1973
26
.As reported by the Boston Globe, "Census Shows Boston
Population Holding Steady at 636,969", reprinted by
the city in February, 1976.
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27from "Notes on the State Census of Population 1975; Con-
firmation of the Revival of Boston as a Place to
Live", BRA research department, February 1975, p.1
28
from "Housing in the North End", Boston College School of
Social Work, December, 1978, p. 41
2 9 irada in an interview, March, 1979
30same as 28 above, p. 34
3 1ibid, p. 35
32ibid, P. 35
33ibid, p. 35
3same as 25 above
35rent to value ratios were calculated as follows:
Change in rent level 60-7
Change in price level 60-70
1.912 = .6
North End-Central District: 2.933
1.32-
City of Boston, average: 1.969 ' 67
3 6
"New Retail Space in Downtown Boston", BRA research, 1973
3 7ibid, p.4
38 Interviews with Filene's and Jordan Marsh inventory and
promotional manageient, see Evaluation Section for
discussion
3 9
"Boston Office Market, A brief look at construction and
vacancy levels", BRA research, August, 1978
h±0 ibid, p.2 the information which follows in th *s section
is drawn. from the tenort's tables.
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Northeastern Real Estate Investment, Prudential, from an
interview with the regional Vice President, May, 1979
2same as 39 above, p. 3
1nterview with Henry Penta, downtowm area commercial property
assessor, April, 1979
from interviews with Joan Smith, family relocation, BRA,
and Jack O'Neil, business relocation, BRA, March 1979
previous to 197f, almost all relocation benefits were less
than $25,000, the, threshhold where the city begins
contributing a 1/3 share. Post 1971, the Federal
government paid the entire cost to relocatees
46renegotiation process is currently underway for the original
tenants. Rouse Company personnel feel it is important
that these tenants be allowed to stay, so rent levels
are assigned which reflect the amount of business they
are doing. At least one tenant will be remaining at
$3.50 a square foot. One meat merchant who introduced
a fast food - sausage on a stick will be paying $30
a square foot, and he feels it is worth it.
47Mirada in an interview, March, 1979.
48Displacement Report, an interim report on the Nature of
Displacement, Displacement in Revitalizing Neighbor-
hoods, and Displacement as a Result of Federal Programs,
Spring, 1979, other reporta include most notably,
"Neighborhood Revitalization: Issues, Trends and Strategies",
March, 1978, and "Tools for Managing Reinvestment and
Minimizing Displacement", March, 1979 both by Phillip
Clay, M.I.T.
based on the 1975 BRA survey, from"Housing in the North End"
December, 1978, p. 36.
5 0ibidp. 39
5 1interview with Henry Penta, April, 1979. He says commercial
property taxes are increasing "considerably" throughout
the area.
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Evaluation of the Project and Actors
The Faneuil Hall Marketplace project is a tremendous
success. That success is a sign if good planning and imple-
mentation on the part of both the developer and the BRA. The
marketplace is both a commercial center and a public amenity.
It was intended to pay homage- to a previous era, through its
architectural restoration and tasteful design, yet to respond
to contemporary needs and requirements of a "New Boston", whose
identity, at the time, was far from clear. Ben Thompson's gift
of foresight, Rouse ts eye for the future, and the BRA's will-
ingness to push for an unconventional idea succeeded in meeting
this challenge. The technical achievement of bringing the idea
to fruitib, as the case study reveals, was far from a sim-
plistic matter. The Rouse Company's performance deserves an
A+. BRA officials agree, and the'public votes with their dol-
lars: the marketplace is an extremely successful shopping cen-
ter. It is economically viable, with long run stability, high
customer appeal end low turnover among tenants. All of this
speaks to Rouse I a performance.
The city officials and the BRA deserve a.pat on the back,
though, I feel in some ways their planning was lacking. Faneuil
Hall Marketplace is a feather in their cap. It is functioning
well and attracts visitors of varied backgrounds from all parts
of the country. Projects like this work to counteract fears
that many have of coming into the city; and fears of lenders
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to invest there. Boston needed a facelift. Cleaning up the
marketplace and waterfront has helped to curb the decline of
this downtown section, and has helped to increase the property
values. Through its precident, Faneuil Hall Marketplace is
encouraging more private investment in downtown.
As a piece of the downtown Urban Renewal effort, the
city's planning worked well in the following respects: The
marketplace compliments other uses in the downtown area.
Visually, economically and aesthetically it is an improvement
on its previous condition. It is also a relief in the urban
landscape - the scale and personality is human, not desolate
and impersonal like the modern architecture of the government
center. Ignoring the expressway, for a moment, the marketplace
succeeds in easing the transition from downtown to the water-
front and North End residential communities. It integrates the
overall plan. The city succeeded, to a large extent, *in
meeting its objectives for the Faneuil Hall area.
From the standpoint of planning for the benefit of the
North End community, however, the city does not fe-rr so well.
My major criticism of the city planners, in this as in all
Boston projects, is their lack of concern for the existing
residents. They were, indeed, planning for a "New Boston".
There was little or no effort in this project to adapt the plans
drawn for the Waterfront or Faneuil Hall district to meet the
North End residents' needs. Too much attention was focused on
downtown workers (mostly suburbanites) and the new residents
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of the Waterfront community. It is this preference that the
North End residents resent and critisize. In effect, the BRA's
approach to planning was (and is) chauvinistic and class conscious.
While widespread displacement has not yet occurred in the North
End, it is inevitable that major change will take place, and
the area will no longer be available for moderate income res-
idents.
More steps could have been taken to mitigate this side
effect. If I were doing the project today, more requirements
would be written into the develpment agreements for the benefit
of neighboring communities. Concerns about housing and employ-
ment opportunities could, in part, be mitigated with job place-
ment assistance for North Enders and the establishment of
low interest revolving loan funds for homeownership assistance
(or some such program). Revenues from development, urban re-
newal funds or other sources could be tapped for these ser-
vices. More steps should be taken to assure that forced dis-
palcement of the residents does not occur in the future. The
city could pahs an ordinance to prevent specualtion, as was
done in the District of Columbia. An anti-speculation ordi-
nance prevents forced evictions by plaoing- heavy taxes on
very short term economic gains on real estate, and requires
the investor to pay relocation expenses for evictees, includ-
ing rental assistance if comparable units cannot be found.
The D.C. ordinance also gives existing tenants first rights
of purchase to their building, if they should so choose. Such
an ordinance should be passed in Boston, but the BRA is not
sufficiently concerned to take these actions.
Transportation is another city shortcoming. The BRA has
been shamefully delinquent in its transportation planning.
More parking and relocated transit stops are vital to the
future of the Waterfront area. Since the opening of Faneuil
Hall Market, commercial establishments on the Wharves have
experienced difficulties; primarily due to lack of parking and
accessibility.. Traffic congestion in the North End is worse
than ever. These are problems the city can, and should have
mitigated, through construction of the promised parking facil-
ities in the area.
Ironically, the setbacks in the original plans may have
been to the city's advantage in the long run. It is hard to
conceive of a project that would have been more popular (though
not from the North End neighborhood's standpoint). Whether
success is the result of foresight (i.e. was by design) or of
circumstance is not the main issue here. It is significant
that support from bhe city wasimpprtant in making the project
a success. Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, the
planners and city officials deserve credit for their efforts
and cooperation. There is still time to correct their short-
comings. Perhaps they will.
Thompson's design is a compliment to the architecturRl
splendor of the buildings. The commercial activitr dots not
distract the eye from the structural integrity, it is soph-
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isticated rendition of previous eras. And the design works.
Thompson's contribution is to many the Marketplace's greatest
element of success.
Reasons for the Project's Success
The reasons fob the marketolace's success can be sum-
marized under two categories: viability and implementation.
The economids, design and location of the project made it
viable, and unicue. The iplemeritation, though not without
obstacles, was completed proffessionally. Three aspects of
implementation were particularly important to assuring success:
the support of the Boston community, the timing of develop-
ment, and Rouse's management style.
The success is a reflection of the performances of the
developer, the architect, and the city planners. The essence
of bringing the project together was the teaming of efforts,
abilities and opportunities. Its success revolves around these
six elements of viability & implementation:
1. the economics of the project
2. the-design
3. the location
4. the support of the Boston community
5. the timing of development
6. the management of the project
All six are discussed more fully below.
-Economics. At outset many evaluators shied away from
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the economics of the project. A conventional market analysis
showed that the populations and incomes were sufficient to
guarantee strong sales volumes from the captive market (the
people who live and work in the vicinity). The question was
how well a downtown shopping mall could capture those dollars.
Mpreover, there was a question of exactly how much it would
cost to renovate the structures, and how much the operating
expenses would be. There was no similar project to use as a
comparison in New England.
In retrospect, the success in terms of rents and sales
volumes justifies the expense and risk that Rouse tndertook.
Rehabilitation costs were extraordinary, more than $80 per
scparefoot on the average. In comparison, the new construction
cost for office buildings in the Boston area is about $50
per square foot, and for retail space it is even lower, about
$32 per square foot. Had the expenses been fully predicted
in the original proposal, financing would have been unobtain-
able. As it was, bankers had trouble believing that the project
could generate rents sufficient to support $20 million in
debt service. The pro forma project rents were $12 to $1L4 per
square foot. These rents, and higher, were relatively easily
obtained. As rent renegotiations are taking place, in the
third year, levels are going as high as ten times the ori-
ginal projections - as high as $150 per square foot, according
to Rouse Company leasing agent, Anne Powell.
Sales volumes at the Marketplace have been phenomenal.
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The strength of the Boston retail market was substantially
underestimated. Sales volumes produced overages sufficient
to cover debt service up to $30 million, the actual.cost.
There is a psychology to bringing together a blend of
tenants which will appeal to the market. Rouse captured the
New Englana market well. Determining the balance of expenses
that will work best is another step in achieving economic
viability. High levels of maintenance and security obviously
generate better quality tenants (and higher priced stores),
and more customers. But, there comes a point of diminishing
return. While some tenants feel he is over zealous, Rouse
sustains his expenses without sacrificing the quality of
environment. The tax agreement is important too. Without it
and the ability to control services, Rouse could not control
cash flows to nearly so great an extent. The tax/lease pay-
ment is linked to revenues, and Rouse determines what the level
of services will be. The city does not perform any of the
service functions, so managing the project is considerably
more than perfunctory duty.
The lease arrangements, and assistance Rouse gives to its
tenants on merchandising, advertising and display, help
assure the viability of the project parts and of the whole.
The flexibility in Rouse's management style contributes sub-
stantially to the economic viability. It helps to increase
sales (and overage rents), and minimizes vacancies. This is
the best way to assure the financial security of the project.
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-Design.- Design was an issue that the city took a long
time to grapple with. The historic character of the struc-
tures was to becpreserved, and in order to properly respect
the market's importance to the community, the new use had to
be carefully planned. Thompsonts design scheme had two-'special
sensitivities: one, the character and integrity of the original
design, and second, an appreciation for and understanding of
the art of retailing. His design facilitates consulmer a.ctivit-
to the extent possible without diminishinq the splendor of*
the structures one bit. A first glance at the marketplace
emphasizes the magnificence of the architecture: the dome,
the Greek pillars and the brick row structures. Second comes
the interaction of people within that space. People linger,
cross back an forth,and enjoy the sidewalk cafes. The natural
tendency within three vertical parallels would be to walk
from one end to the other. The design, however, facilitates
more movement from side to side. Third, shops invite browsing.
The window displays are tasteful, and the signage is backed
away from the facade. Inside, food counters are crowded with
people, lots of personal interaction tales place. The adver-
tising of individual proprietorships takes a back seat to the
architecture. Beams, pillars and walls remain readily visible.
Tasteful introduction of commercial activities in a classic
architectural setting make the markets a place where people
want to return.
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-Location. Traditional thinking about shopping centers
suggested that the three most important things were location,
location and location. In fact, location is an important key
to the success of the project. At the same time, location
scared many potential developers away. The banks certainly
were wary of it. Few areas are more accessible in Boston
then the Faneuil Hall Markets. They are adjacent to the main
expressway, and three subway lines go practically to the door.
There is a huge, captive market of daytime workers. Boston
is a regional center and an employment headquarter. There
has been a return to the city of young people, and people with
better incomes. Being adjacent to Boston's most extensive
public improvement projects (including luxury housing & office
construction) was viewed as a real locational advantage (that
is, assuming that the projects were finished in a responsible
fashion).
Besides these advantages, the buildings and site itself
were really ideal. They had been the traditional markets, so
the image of a marketplace was not a new one for the location.
Rouse developed a new kind of urban marketplace, and
guessed correctly that Boston would be ready for it. The
success was aided by the fact that the marketplace sits right
along the freedom trail. Boston was a big tourist city for
the bicentennial. These considerations add more plusses to
the site location in Boston.
Rouse is making headway in breaking down some of the
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traditional prejudices against the city. Many of the fears
of downtown retailing are being dispelled by his recent
undertakings in several cities. While Faneuil Hall is among
those examples, its location does have peculiar advantages
not likely to be replicated in many other places. His Phil-
adelphia project, Galler, East, for example, is located in the
heart of one of the toughest central city neighborhoods, where
white residents have been afraid to go for years. Not only
do whites go there now, but more important, the market there
is well integrated - dispelling yet another myth about urban
retailing - that once the clientele begins to change racially,
like neighborhoods, the shoppers will flee. This simply has
not happened in Philadelphia. A racial balance has not been
achieved at Faneuil Hall, but this has more to do with-the
location (very white area) and with racial problems in Boston's
past. It will take more than willingness on the part of the
developer to lease space to minority entrepeneurs in Boston to
integrate the project. Minority vendors and shoppers must
feel comfortable doing business in that part of town. That
is something Rouse cannot fully control.
-Support. The willingness of the city to bend with the
developer, to cooperate with unconventional ideas, and to take
a risk, made a tremendous difference in the success of the
marketplace. As mentioned in. the economics section, without
a 99 year lease, and reasonable, percentage-based tax/lease
payments, financing would have been impossible, and the project
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may not have been economically viable. The willingness of
the city to permit Rouse to do his own improvements, and to
provide his own services was important to the eventual qual-
ity of the marketplaces. It was alsot-to the city's advantage
in that they could better control their expenditures. But
not many city governments have thle power to be flexible in
these arrangements.
The city project- in the Governent Center, and on the
waterfront, were as important as the marketplace redevelop-
ment in changing the image oftthe area. Their contribution
to the success of the marketplace should not be underplayed.
(Note, the banks were not as comfortab.le relying on the city's
promises for these areas as was Rouse. His confidence in them
in this instance was important.)
Financing the project was a feat of acrobatics and per-
suasion, and the city lent a hand in that effort. At least
a third of the consortium participants admit that the pressure
from the Boston Globe and City Hall was important in winning
their participation.
The other active way in which City Hall supported Rouse
was the promotion of the project. The mayor attended the
opening ceremonies. Such "pomp and cirtumstance" rarely acecm-
panies a project done by the private sector. Visiting VIP's
were in attendance, and the Boston Pops even appeared at the
third occasion. In addition to public appearances, the city
has done a tremendous promotional job for Rouse. The city is
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proud of the marketplace, and advertises the fact. Rouse
certainly does not mind the free PR.
-Timing. Three elements of the timing assured that the
marketplace achieved its greatest possible success. First was
the timing'as the opening celebrations with the bicentennial.
There has not been such a time of celebration, appreciation
for history, or festive atmosphere in Boston for many, many
years (and probably will not be for years hance). The numbers
of tourists coming through the project in its first year
really established the marketplace. The volume of visitors
had more to do with the bicentennial, than the marketplace's
reputation.
Second, the timing of the revitalization of the market-
place was concurrent with the renewal activities in adjacent
areas. It was important to be a part of the changing image,
and to capitalize on the momentum generated there in. The
excitement of new-ness did not fade.
Third, phasing of the project did a lot for the financial
feasibility. It is very doubtful Rouse could have met his pro
forma rents ($12 per square foot in the South Building and $1L
per square foot in the North Building) without the established
success of the Quincy Building. With sales at more than $300
per square foot, merchants were more than anxious to lease the
space in other buildings, even at these high rents. And only
after a strong performance could Rouse have obtained additional
financing. Had the project been undertaken all at once, it
might have been considerably underfunded, or the quality might
have been sacrificed.
-Management. Now that the project is up, the most impor-
tant ingredient to the marketplace's success is the management.
The long run success or decline of the marketplace depends on
Rouse's ability to capture the market, to hold on to the tenants,
and to trouble-shoot -- make sure nothing goes wrong physically,
socially, aesthetically, or competitively. Many of the steps
taken in the set-up of the marketplace were important in its
initial profitability, and continue to play a role in its long
run operation. Most important among these is Rouse's leasing
procedure. It is useful to discuss it in detail. Leasing at
Faneuil Hall Market was done with a sensitivity fo the in-
dual merchant's ability to pay, and attention to the o-erall
concept and mix at the marketplace. Rather than lease space
to the highest bidder, Rouse sought tenants of a certain kind
to round out the mix. Rent levels were established according
to the kind of business, and other considerations, like location
within the development and street frontage. Overage rents assure
that each merchant pays Rouse a share of the spoils. In effect,
those shops with large volumes and profits help subsidize the
rents of other, lower volume stores, because it is the mix which
creates the market. Extra charges for maintenance and security
have helped encourage merchants to take a hand in the upkeep
175
of the area, and aid in keeping these costs to a minimum. In
the lease renewal process, upping the rent to the effective
rate the tenant was paying is a fair way of assuring that
the landlord and tenant can live with the arrangement; both
interests are protected. The landlord receives increases, and
the tenants- are not required to pay more than in effect they
did the previous year.
The case study illuminates that many management and con-
trol activities have been involved in maintaining the market-
place environment. These controls have been key in the market-
place's ongoing success. Among them are: signage restrictions,
merchandise restrictions, control over street musicians and
sidewald vendors, adequate security, flexibility with extra
(especially maintenance) charges, promotion of clothing, and
traditional merchandise, and day to day trouble-shooting. On-
site staff is very important to maintaing this control. The
Rouse people are in constant observation of ongoing activities,
and are knowledge about tenant's operations so they can help
out before a situation becomes a problem. Rouse provides a
good example of strong management.
The Marketplace Model
In utilizing Faneuil Hall as a model, the importance of
viability and elements of implementation become readily ap-
parent. Four main planning steps emerge from the case as
keys to joint venture developments. Broadening the planner's
role in these processes will improve the reputation of city
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planning as a profession. The steps are: 1. evaluatirjpoten-
tial and enticing development; 2. examining planning issues,
(these assure project viability); 3. setting up the deal;and
4. conedientiously following through (these are the basic
elements of implementation). Each is brieflv discussed below.
-Evaluating and enticing development. An assessment should
be made of the city's resources. Developable parcels in
key locations, unique historic landmarks, a strong retail
market, special bonding authority, are among the resources a
city has to entice a developer. Whatever a city has to offer
should be evaluated for potential. Part of this evaluation
involves understanding a developer's concerns and interests,
because the goal is to figure out the best setup for the parcel
-- such that the designation meets the local community's needs
as well. Once the land use is established, it can be determined
whether land write-down or other forms of public assistance
are needed. The city may want to sent out RFPt s (request for
proposals) to permit private sector feedback suggestions. Fea-
sibility should enter strongly into the plannernl determinaA
tions. With a vision in mind, the important thing is to make
sure there is enough support to pull the project off with
reasonable certainty.
-Doing the Home work on Planning Issues. Attention
should be focussed on the potentential impacts of the project.
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An impact assessment should always be conducted. Timing,
access, infrastructure improvements, scale and other concerns
(including displacement) should be addressed in the ore-
development planning stage. Design and environmental controls
should be pre-programmed. A thorough study of planning issues
will assure that these concerns are dealt with explicitly
in the development agreement. It will help minimize or avoid
potential problems, assure that the project compliments sur-
rounding areas and make clear what sorts of safeguards should
be taken in the development process.
.etting JUp the Deal. Choosing a developer, establishing
the contractural agreements, and determining management controls
and responsibilities are issues of great importance to the out-
come, as the Faneuil Hall case illustrates. A reliable devel-
oper can make or break the project. The relationship between
the city and developer can take on many variations, the market-
place introduced some innovations. In each situation the best
arrangement is on where quality is assured, and each partner
contributes the best of its talent. In most instances this
means the city does much of the planning, like infrastructure,
transportation access, land use controls; and the developer
does the building and leasing. Cooperation may be the best
alternative for the other arrangements.
-Development Support and Selling the Project-Following
Througph. Regardless of who has responsibility, there are
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hundreds of oversight functions, each of which can be important
to the ;outcome. They include: design review, leasing, main-
tenance and security, market research, public relitions, pro-
motional campaigns, and management control, among others.
Public involvement in these steps can enhance the whole projz2ct.
The experiences with urban renewal in Boston offer a lot of
lessons, perhaps more poor examples then good ones. Ther
fundamentally underscore, however, the importance of com-
prehensive and long range planning for developments.
The success of the Faneuil Hall project in Boston is
encouraging for city planners. While many elements of the
project are unique, it illustrates the power of a central
city location if a project is done well. Faneuil Hall
Marketplace is an example of what there is to gain.
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT FEATURES OF 179
FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE PROJECT
ECONOMICS
all of the pieces came together in time - financing, lease-
up, tax agreement - and the market responded quickly
rents are sufficient to pay back the loans, to support
operating expenses and to pay taxes. Income from the
project justifies the investment.
shopping volumes are high enough to support rent levels
everybody is making money
DESIGN
sound construction and Parris design of original structures
new scheme is well adapted to the structures
the design promotes the function - retailing - by influencing
the flow of people through the space
the buildings have important historic qualities
the design and activities compliment adjacent land uses
LOCATION
captive daytime market
accessability by freeway and public transportation
adaptability of area and site to retailing
being in Boston, and near the freedom trail, and airport
being downtown as downtown is beginning to make a comeback
SUPPORT
99-year, percentage of income tax/lease agreement
flexibility in permitting Rouse to take over many functions
and to implement'-Thompson design and their retailing scheme.
city's aid in persuading the financial community
responsible completion of adjacent area projects.
opening ceremony celebrations, free PR
TIMING
concurrent development with other revitalization activities
opening coincided with the bi-centennial
phasing aided financing and reputation
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SUIMARY - - CONTINUED
MANAGEMENT
innovative financing scheme
effective tenant recruitment - pushcart innovation
successful tenant mixture which captured the New England
market
unique leasing arrnagements which control for expenses
permit sharing of development profits
effective budget control
creation of a safe and pleasant atmosphere
avoiding nuisance problems by managing the street musicians
and controlling street vendors
effective promotional campaign - professionals to help
establish image of the marketplace
signage and merchandisin7 controls
provision of business and technical expertise and assistance
to marketplace vendors
alert trouble-shooting management style, attentive and
present at the marketplace, not operating out of Maryland
offices.
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Hours of Operation: Monday thru Saturday - 11:00 AM to 9:00 PM 187
Sunday - 12:00 PM to 6:00 PM
Any licensee who does not maintain these hours will be in violation of the "Bull
Market License" and will be subject to immediate termination of their License. All
the carts will be set up and in operation by 11:00 AM.
Location of Carts: The location of all carts will be at the discretion of the Bull
Market Manager and is subject to change whenever Management determines it is in the
best interest of the Bull Market.
Carts are approximately 3' x 6' and are licensed to operate in an 8' x 8' area. Li-
censees must confine themselves to their allocated area and stay within the starred-
off area.
Merchandise: Licensees are to merchandise only those items that are agreed to in ad-
vance by the licensee and the Bull Market Management. Any new products must be ap-
proved before they are displayed. Enforcement of this policy is essential, and fail-
ure to abide by this regulation will result in the License being terminated.
Fixtures: All signs attached to pushcarts must be approved by Management. All emtpy
boxes and plexiglass must be taken to the storage area and not left in or around the
pushcart. Any licensee who defaces a cart will be billed for the cost of the repairs.
Licensee will limit themselves only to the fixtures which accompany the cart upon
set-up; as the pushcart should not have the appearance of a permanant store.
Stock and Display: Each licensee is expected to have a complete inventory of merchan-
dise on hand daily. The Bull Market is a focal point and in an area of high visibility.
Merchandising in an 8' x 8' area is of paramount importance. The carts must not have
the appearance of emptiness or sloppiness and must be 100% merchandised at all times.
Storage Area: Licensees will use the storage area provided by the Bull Market. Each
licensee will be assigned a certain bin, and will be responsible for providing their
own lock. We will not be responsible for merchandise lost or stolen from the storage
area. This area is used at licensee's risk. Any merchandise left around the storage
area and not in the bins will be discarded.
Rates: Week - Thursday thru Wednesday $125 .00=or 10% of gross sales, which
Carts and Stand (8' x 8' Area) ever is the greater(10% over $1000)
Month - 1st Thursday for 28 Days $400.00 or 10% of gross sales, which-
Carts and Stand (8' x 8' Area) ever is the greater (10% over $4000)
Payment: Payment must be made in advance of cart set-up. All Bull Market tenants must
report their gross sales to the Bull Market Manager on a weekly basis. Permanent tenantf
in either the Arcade or Gallery utilizing cart space in the Bull Market will report
their gross sales on a weekly basis to the Bull Market Manager. The gross sales done
on the cart will be kept separate from those sales done in the store. Rental will re-
main $4"'/month or 10% of gross sales, whichever is the greater.
Failure of Bull Market Licensee to Report Gross Sales-In the event that licensee fails
to report gross sales, or pay minimum rent, the Bull Market Manager will have the right
to terminate their license.
NOTE: If License is revoked for any reason there will be no return of licensee's fee.
Alcohol: Licensee will not be premitted to drink or bring alcohol in or around their
assigned area or in another Bull Market licensee's area.
VIOLATION OF THESE RULES OF OPERATION WILL SUBJECT LICENSEE TO IMMEDIATE REVOCATION >,
OF HIS LICENSE.
Contact- Anne Powell- 523-2980
2Faneuil Hal1 Narkelfp1ace Boston , *IASS 0'2E09'
Calculations o' City and State
TAX YIELDS
by the city of Boston
from: "Faneuil Hall Marketplace: The Differential in City
and State Yield", BRA research, September, 1978
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Table 1
FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE 
- TOTAL COMPLEX
215,000 sq. ft. retail space
170,000 sq. ft. office space
Retail sales $57,500,000
860 retail workers
/ 850 office workers
Sales Tax*:
Corporate Income Tax:
Rouse Corporate Income Tax:
Income Tax:-
Total Annual Estimated State Yield =
Total Annual Estimated City Yield =
20% Yield of State
31% Yield of State
32% Yield of State
28% Yield of State
$2,300,000
1,788,000
113,362
897,000
$5,098,362
$1,417,031
(in Quincy Building).
(in South Building).
(in North Building).
(Total Complex).
* State meals tax is considered reduced to 5 percent
as of January 1, 1979.
City is
City is
City is
City is
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FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE - QUINCY BLDG.
75,000 sq. ft. of retail space
$300 sales per sq. ft.
Sales of $22,500,000
300 workers @ 250 sq.ft./worker
Sales Tax: 20% tax exempt = $4,500,000 sales
15% @ 5% (sales) 3,350,000
65% @ 5% (meals) 14,650,000
Total Sales Tax Yield
0-
$167,500
732,500
900,000
Net Corporate Income Tax:
30% of $22,500,000 = $6,750,000 profit
8% corporate income excise on
profit 20 540,000
Rouse Corporate Income = $1,265,625
8% tax on 25% profit =
Income Tax from 300 workers
Assumed $9,000 salary per worker
5% tax on $2,700,000 =
25,312
135,000
Total Annual Revenue for State
City Revenue Based on Lease Agreement with
Rouse Co.:
25% of Gross Rent of $1,265,625
$1, 600,312
316,406
Total Annual Revenue for City $316, 406
Table 3
FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE - SOUTH BLDG.
80,000 sq. ft. of retail space
90,000 sq. ft. of office space
$250 sales per sq. ft. in retail
Sales of $20,000,000
320 retail workers @a 250 sq.ft./worker
450 office workers 200 sq.ft./worker
20% tax exempt =
50% @ 5% (sales)
30% @ 5% (meals)
$4,000,000 sales 0
10,000,000 S500,000
6,000,000 300,000
Total Sales Tax Yield
Net Corporate Income Tax:
30% of $20,000,000 = $6,000,000
profit
8% corporate income excise on
profit =
30% of $9,000,000 office income
@ $100 income/sq.ft.
8% of $2,700,000 profit
Rouse Corporate Income: $1,350,000 retail
1,080,000 office
S2,430,000 total
Tax 8% on 25% of above -
Income Tax: 320 workers - $9,000 = $2,880,000
5% of s2,880,000 a 144,000
450 workers @ $12,000 = 5,400,000
5% of $5,400,000 = 270,000
Total Income Tax Yield -
Total Annual Estimated Revenue
for State $1,958,600
Based on Lease Agreement with.
25% of retail rent of $1,350,OCO = 337,300
25% of office rent of s1,080,OC0 - 270,000
Total Annual Estimated Revenue
!or City
Sales tax:
$800,000
480,000
216,000
48, 600
414,000
City Revenue
Rotse Co.
S607, 300
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Table 4
FANEUIL HLL MARKETPLACE - NCRTH BLDG.
60,000 sq.ft. of retail space
80,000 sq.ft. of office space
$250 sales per sq. ft. in retail
Sales of $15,000,000
240-retail workers @ 250 sq. ft./worker
400 office workers @ 200 sq. ft./worker
Sales Tax: 20% tax exempt = $3,000,000 sales 0
50%K@ 5% (sales) 7,500,000 $375,000
30% 1 5% (meals) 4,500,000 225,000
Total Sales Tax Yield s600,000
set Corporate Income Tax:
30% of $15,000,000 retail sales =
$4,500,000 profit
8% corporate income excise on
profit = 360,000
30% of $8,000,000 office income
@ $100/income/sq. ft. = $2,400,000
8% corporate income excise on
profit - 192,000
Rouse Corporate Income Tax: $1,012,500 retail
960,000 office
S1,972,500 total
T?,c 8% on 25% of Total = 39,450
Income Tax:
240 workers 4 $9,000 = $2,160,000
5% of $2,160,000 = 108,000
400 workers @ $12,000 - 4,800,000
5% of $4,800,000 = 240,000
Total Income Tax Yield = 348,000
Total Annual Estimated Revenue
for State S1,539,450
City 2evenua based on lease agreement with
Rouse Co.
25% of retail rent of 31,012,500 = 253,125
25% of office rent of S960,000 = 240,000
Total Annual Estimaced Revenue
for city 493,125
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Financial Institutions - April 20 - 27
Aller, V.P., State Street Bank
Anthony, New England Lif'e, Mortgage and Real Estate Division
Archibald, V.P., South Boston Savings Bank
Coveney, V.P., Boston Five Cent Savings Bank
Ernst, John Hancock Insuranc, Company, City Mot ge Dept.
Damon, V.P., Charlestom Savings Bank
Kennedy, Commonwealth Bank Corporation,, Commonwealth Bank
and Trust
Swain, V.P., Tew England Merchants National Bank
Switten, V.P., Union Warren Savings Bank
Williams, V.P., Shawrmut Bank
Store Owners and Management - April 9 - 20
Ann Taylor, Faneuil Hall, Boylston Street, Harvard Sciare
Brown Derby Deli, Faneuil Hall
Coffee Connection, Faneuil Hall, Harvard Square
Crate and Barrel, Faneuil Hall, HarvarA Square
Crickets, Faneuil Hall
Filene'fs, Washing ton Street
Gepetto's Toys, Faneuil Hall
Goods, Faneuil Hall, Harvard Square
Jordan Marsh, Washington Street
Louis, Faneuil Hall, Boylston Street
Magic Pan, Faneuil, Hall
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Papagallo, Faneuil Hall, Newbury Street
Regina t s Pizzeria, Faneuil Hall
Swenson't s, Faneuil Hall
The Sandpiper, Faneuil Hall
